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JEROME FRANKt
EVERY few years, during the past fifteen, I have made a speech or
written an article expressing my views about the deficiencies of Ameri-
can legal education. ' No one has ever paid much attention to those
views. Here I shall do little more than repeat what I've often said be-
fore, thinking wistfully that perhaps this time some of my audience
will not dissent. 2
American legal education went badly wrong some seventy years
ago when it was seduced by a brilliant neurotic. I refer to the well-
known founder of the so-called case system, Christopher Columbus
Langdell. I call him a neurotic advisedly. He was a cloistered, bookish
man, and bookish, too, in a narrow sense. In his student days at Har-
vard Law School, he haunted the library, poring over the Year Books;
he is said to have expressed regrets that he had not lived in the time of
the Plantagenets. In his sixteen years of practice he led a secluded life,
seeing little of clients, for the most part in the law library writing briefs
and drafting pleadings for other lawyers. One of his biographers says of
that period, "In the almost inaccessible retirement of his office, in the
library of the Law Institute, he did the greater part of his work. He
went little into company." Returned to Harvard as a law teacher,
there soon to become Dean, he is said to have referred to "a compara-
tively recent case decided by Lord Hardwicke."
His pedagogic theory reflected the man. The experience of the lawyer
* This article is based upon an address delivered at the National Student Conference
on Legal Education, New York City, July 12, 1947. The text of the original address has,
however, been expanded to enlarge on suggestions which, because of time limits, could
not be considered in detail at the Conference.
' United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. Among my writings of which this paper is in part a restatement are the follow-
ing: IF MEN VE ANEuLs passim (1942), and especially 105-, 314-5; Are Judges Hu-
nan? , 80 U. OF PA. L. Rtv. 233, 252-60 (1931) ; What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. R.
761, 778-81 (1932) ; Why Arot A Clinical Lauwyar-School?, 81 U. or PA. L. RV. 907
(1933); What Constitutes A Good Legal Education, 19 A. B. A. J. 723 (1933); What'es
Wrong With The Law Schools, an address delivered in Washington, D. C., September 15,
1938; cf. LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) passim.
2. In some earlier writings, seeking to avoid a show of egotism, I used the imper-
sonal approach, saying, "the writer," when I meant "I." I have come to believe that
the first personal pronoun is less egotistic, for it abandons the impersonal disguise and
frankly reveals the personal character of the statements.
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-in his office, with clients, and in the court-room with judges and juries,
were, to Langdell, improper materials for the teacher and his student.
They must, he insisted, shut their eyes to such data. They must devote
themselves exclusively to what was discoverable in the library. The
essence of his teaching philosophy he expressed thus: "First that law
is a science; second, that all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books." This second proposition, it is said, was
"intended to exclude the traditional methods of learning law by work
in a lawyer's office, or attendance upon the proceedings of courts of
justice." 3
Langdell declared that "the library is to us what the laboratory i's
to the chemist or the physicist and what the museum is to the natural-
ist. . . . The most essential feature of the [Harvard Law] School, that
which distinguishes it most widely from all other schools of which
I have any knowledge, is the library. . . Without the library the
School would lose its most important characteristics, and indeed its
identity." In the same vein, the President of Harvard commented not
long after, "The Corporation recognizes that the library is the very
heart of the [Law] School." In The Centennial History of Harvard Law
School (published in 1918) it was said, "If it be granted that law is to
be taught as a science and in the scientific spirit, previous experience
in practice becomes as unnecessary as is continuance in practice after
teaching begins." 4
This philosophy of legal education was that of a man who cherished
"inaccessible retirement." Inaccessibility, a nostalgia for the forgotten
past, devotion to the hush and quiet of a library, exclusion from con-
sideration of the all-too-human clashes of personalities in law office
and courtroom, the building of a pseudo-scientific system based solely
ipon book-materials-of these Langdell compounded the Langdell
method.
The neurotic escapist character of Langdell stamped itself on the
educational programs of our leading law schools. As a consequence,
until a short time ago, most of the teachers in those schools either
had little or no experience in active legal practice or, more im~portant,
if they had, yet when they withdrew from practice to teaching, they
succumbed to an atmosphere in which the memories of practice became
shadowy and unreal. The Langdell spirit choked legal education. It
compelled the experienced practitioner, turned teacher, to belittle his
experience at the bar. It forced him to place primary emphasis on the
library, to regard a collection of books as the heart of the law school.
3. CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 231' (1918). For more detailed
descriptions of Harvard Law School under Langdell see Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lauw-
yer-School,.81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 907, 908 (1933); Frank, What Constitutes a Good
Legal Education, 19 A.B.AJ. 723 (1933).
4. CEN=.NiAL HISTORY OF HA vARD LAW SCHOOL 72 (1918).
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A school with a library as its heart is what one may well imagine. The
men who teach there, however interested they may once have been in
the actualities of the law office and the courtroom, must pay only a
subordinate regard to those actualities. The books are the thing. The
word, not the deed. Or only those deeds which are or become words.
Verbal acts, so to say, are central, and all else peripheral.
In such a school, that which is not in books has become "unscientific";
it may perhaps have truth, but it is a lesser truth, relatively unreal;
true reality is achieved by facts only when reported in books. To be
sure, Dean Pound, many years ago, spoke of "law in action." That
awakened hopes. But has Harvard been showing its students "law in
action"? The students have had the opportunity to read in books and
law review articles about some very limited phases of law in action.
But that, at most, is law in action in the library.
At Harvard's law school the students are given courses in evidence,
practice, and pleading. Close by, courts are in action, and especially
trial courts, where one can observe evidence in action, practice in ac-
tion, pleading in action, torts in action, property in action. Are the
students urged to attend the courts frequently? Do they spend many
days there? Are they accompanied there by their professors who com-
ment thereafter on what has been observed? Are the students familiar
with the development of cases in those courts? Are they asked to specu-
late on the next move to be made in a suit-at a time when the results
of that move depend on foresight and skill, instead of hindsight? Are
the procedural possibilities of a real lawsuit shown to the students by
their professors, together with the so-called substantive law formulae-
or are the two split up into separate courses? I mention Harvard. I
could as well refer to almost any of the leading university law schools.
Do they make any effort to watch, describe and interpret courts in
action?
"Law in action" was a happy phrase. It contained, to be sure, that
miserably ambiguous word "law." Yet it was a pointer or guidepost;
it seemed to indicate a new direction. But what university law school
has followed the pointer? .The phrase "law in action" has remained a
phrase; at any rate, so far as legal pedagogy is concerned, the function
of the phrase, psychologically, has been to substitute a new verbal
formula for revised conduct. The contents of the bottle remained much
the same, the label was changed. One is reminded of the scene in the
Gilbert and Sullivan opera where the policemen march around and
around the stage promising the distracted father that they will rescue
his daughters from the pirates who have abducted them. "We go, we
go," shout the policemen as they continue to march in circles. "But
they don't go," exclaims the father despairingly.
Litigation is the ultimate reference for the lawyer. By and large, in
the last analysis, legal rights and duties, so-called, are nothing more
1947] 1305
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or less than actual or potential successes or failures in lawsuits. 6 A
lawyer who has inadequate acquaintance with litigious processes is,
relatively, an impotent lawyer. Indeed, the lawyer is differentiated
from other men by the sole fact that he, more expertly than others, is
supposed to know the ways of courts. '(When I speak of courts, I in-
clude administrative agencies, which constitute a special sort of court.)
When you come to practice and, acting for your client, Mr. Shadrach,
draw his will, or pass on a bond issue, or organize a corporation, or
negotiate the settlement of a controversy, or draft a legislative bill,
you will--or you should be-concerned with how the courts will act.
If you are competent, you will, as best you can, try to answer this ques-
tion: "what will happen if those specific documents or transactions
hereafter become a part of the drama of a trial?" For the legal rights
and duties of your client, Mr. Shadrach, under any given document, or
in connection with any given transaction, may mean simply what some
court, somewhere, some day in the future, will decide at the end of a
trial in a future concrete lawsuit relating to Shadrach's specific rights
under that specific document or in connection with that specific trans-
action. In the last push, when your client gets into litigation, he has
a legal right if he wins the law suit, a legal duty if he loses it.
You will note that I have emphasized trials and trial courts. In that
respect, I differ from most law teachers. With a very few notable ex-
ceptions, the kind of so-called "law" taught by most professors in the
schools consists of deductions from upper-court opinions. The schools,
generallyspeaking, are upper-court law schools. But upper courts, courts
of the sort in which I sit, are relatively unimportant for most clients.
Why? Because the overwhelming majority of lawsuits are never ap-
pealed, and, in most of the small minority which are appealed, the ap-
pellate courts accept the facts as "found" by the trial court.
This brings me to the transcendent importance of the facts of cases.
A legal rule, principle or standard, says merely this: "If the facts are
thus and so, these are the legal consequences." In a lawsuit, any par-
ticular rule, then, should be applied only if the facts invoking that rule's
application are found to exist. If you, as a lawyer, assert that a given
rule should govern your client's case, you will therefore fail, you will
lose your suit, unless either the opposing lawyer concedes that those
are the facts, (which he seldom does), or you persuade the trial court
(a jury or a trial judge sitting without a jury) that those are the facts.
Now the actual facts in a suit do not walk into the courtroom. For
they are past events, events which occurred before the suit began. The
trial judge or jury, in most cases (i. e., those in which the facts are
disputed) can usually learn about those past facts in but one way-
5. Warning: This statement is qualified in the discussion of out-of-court sanctions,
infra p. 1329.
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through the court-room narratives of witnesses. The witnesses, being
human, may make mistakes in their original observation of the facts,
in their memories of what they thus observed, or at the trial in their
reports of their memories. Some witnesses deliberately lie. Many
others are biased, and, because of bias, unconsciously distort their
stories. The trial judge or juries, who are themselves merely fallible
human witnesses of the witnesses, must guess which, if any, of the wit-
nesses accurately testify about the actual past facts.
A guess it must be, since there exist no mechanical instruments for
weighing evidence or for determining the honesty and accuracy of the
respective witnesses.6 We have not yet perfected a foolproof lie detector;
we certainly now have no detector of the unconscious distortions of
prejudiced but honest witnesses; and almost surely we will never have
a contrivance for correcting a witness' original mistaken observation
of the facts.
The facts, then, for decisional purposes are no more than what trial
judges or juries guess-what they think the facts are (or, more accu-
rately, what they publicly say or imply they think the facts are). 7 The
"facts" consist, therefore, of the fallible subjective reactions of the
trial judge or jury to the fallible reactions of the witness. Consequently,
subjectivity, in two ways, inheres in trial-court fact-finding in the
subjective reactions of the witnesses, and in the subjective reactions to
the witnesses of the jury or trial judge. Specific decisions frequently
turn on such subjective reactions, culminating in such fallible findings
of the facts. In court-houses, the legal rules are never self-operative,
are always at the mercy of those findings, and often of that subjec-
tivity. 8 I can perhaps most easily indicate the practical significance
6. See FANXK, IF MEN VERE ANGELS 90-4 (1942).
7. The words in parenthesis are necessary because of the following: Most jury ver-
dicts are general verdicts which give no clue to what the jury thinks the facts are. Many
decisions of trial judges are unaccompanied either by published findings of fact or opin-
ions by trial judges; we know only what the trial judges report as to their belief as to the
facts, and when the testimony is conflicting, so that an issue of credibility arises,.we usu-
ally have no means of knowing whether those reports accurately state those beliefs. See
Frank, What Courts Do Ins Fact, 26 I,.. L. REv. 761 (1932); FntAzm, IF MEN VMZ
ANGELS c. VII, apps. III, V (1945) ; Frank, Introduction to PAUL, STuDms . TAXATO.
(1932). See my dissenting opinion in La Touraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157
F.2d 115, 123-4 (C.C.A.2d 1946), to this effect: Since, when a trial judge's decision turns
on the credibility of witnesses, "his 'finding' of 'facts,' responsive to the testimony, is in-
herently subjective (i.e., what he actually believes to be the facts is hidden from scrutiny
by others), his concealed disregard of evidence is always a possibility. An upper court
must accept that possibility, and must recognize, too, that such hidden misconduct by a
trial judge lies beyond its control.'
8. I have suggested that the conventional theory of the decisional process may be
crudely symbolized as R x F = D, where R, represents the rules, F the facts and D the
decision. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 77-8 (1942); In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 464
(C.C.A.2d 1947).
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of that subjectivity by quoting what I have said elsewhere I with re-
spect to the trial judge: "What we call the 'facts' of a case constitute,
often, the most important ingredient of the trial judge's decision. But
when the testimony is in conflict-as it is in thousands of cases-the
'facts' of a lawsuit consist of the judge's belief as to what those facts
are. That belief results from the impact on the judge of the words,
gestures, postures, and grimaces of the witnesses. His reaction-inher-
ently and inescapably subjective-is a composite of the way in which
his personal predilections and prejudices are stimulated by the sights
and sounds emanating from the witnesses. Now these personal atti-
tudes of the judge reflect the subtlest influences of his experience and
of the manner in which he has moulded them into what we describe,
loosely, as his 'personality'. Where he was born and educated, his
parents, the persons he has met, his teachers and companions, the
woman he married, the books and articles he has read-these and
multitudinous other factors, undiscoverable for the most part by any
outsider, affect his notion of the 'facts'. 10 All kinds of obscure, unar-
ticulated community moral attitudes thus play their part in his fact-
determination." As I recently said, on behalf of our court: n "Democ-
racy must, indeed, fail unless our courts try cases fairly, and there can
be no fair trial before a judge lacking in impartiality and disinterested-
ness. If, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total
absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then no one has
ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The human' mind, even in
infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions;
and the process of education, formal and informal, creates attitudes
in all men which affect them in judging situations, attitudes which pre-
cede reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by defini-
tion, are prejudices. Without acquired 'slants', preconceptions, life
could not go on. Every habit constitutes a pre-judgment; were those
If, now, the actual, objective, facts are called OF, and the subjective facts (i.e., those
"found".by the trial judge or jury) are called SF, then we should revise the decisional
formula to read R x SF - D.
Even that formula is too crude, for it neglects the interaction of SF and R. (See also
note 7 supra.) As to a related subject, the gestalt aspect of the trial judge's or jury's de-
cisional process, see In re Fried, supra at 463 n. 28; see also my dissenting opinion in Old
Colony Bondholders v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 161 F.2d 413, 449-50 (C.C.A.2d 1947).
9. FRANK, A Sketch of an Influence in ITHU'uRTATiOxs OF Monn t LCAL Pm-
LosoPHiEs 189, 235 (1947).
10. See more in detail, FRANK, LAW AND Tna. MODERN MIND 104-117, 268 n. 2
(1930). Attention is there called to the fact that most adherents of "sociological juris-
prudence," in emphasizing the political, social and economic views of judges, largely dis-
regarded the far less discernible factors affecting judicial reactions, and, having little in-
terest in trial courts, paid virtually no heed to the effect of judicial attitudes on the find-
ings of the facts in specific law suits.
11. In re J. P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650 (C.C.A.2d 1943).
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pre-judgments which we call habits absent in any person, were he obliged
to treat every event as an unprecedented crisis presenting a wholly
new problem, he would go mad. Interests, points of view, preferences,
are the essence of living. Only death yields dispassionateness, for such
dispassionateness signifies utter indifference. 'To live . .. is to have
an ethics or scheme of values, and to have a scheme of values is to have
a point of view, and to have a point of view is to have a prejudice or
bias . . .' An 'open mind', in the sense of a mind containing no pre-
conceptions whatever, would be a mind incapable of learning anything,
would be that of an utterly emotionless human being, corresponding
roughly to the psychiatrist's descriptions of the feeble-minded. More
directly to the point, every human society has a multitude of estab-
lished attitudes, unquestioned postulates. Cosmically, they may seem
parochial prejudices, but many of them represent the community's
most cherished values and ideals. Such social preconceptions, the 'value
judgments' which members of any given society take for granted and
use as the unspoken axioms of thinking, find their way into that soci-
ety's legal system, become what has been termed 'the valuation system
of the law'. The judge in our society owes a duty to act in accordance
with those basic predilections inhering in our legal system (although,
of course, he has the right, at times, to urge that some of them he modi-
fied or abandoned). The standard of dispassionateness obviously dces
not require the judge to rid himself of the unconscious influence of such
social attitudes.
"In addition to those acquired social value judgments, every judge,
however, unavoidably has many idiosyncratic 'leanings of the mind',
uniquely personal prejudices .... He may be stimulated by uncon-
scious sympathies for, or antipathies to, some of the witnesses, layvers
or parties in a case before him. As Josiah Royce observed, 'Oddities
of feature or of complexion, slight physical variations from the cus-
tomary, a strange dress, a scar, a too-steady look, a limp, a loud or deep
voice, any of these peculiarities . ..may be, to one, an object of fas-
cinated curiosity; to another . .. , an intense irritation, an object of
violent antipathy.' In Ex parte Chase . .. Judge Peters said he had
'known a popular judicial officer grow quite angry with a suitor in his
court, and threaten him with imprisonment, for no ostensible reason,
save the fact, that he wore an overcoat made of wolfskins,' and spoke
of 'prejudice, which may be swayed and controlled by the merest tri-
fles--such as the toothache, the rheumatism, the gout, or a fit of indi-
gestion . ... 'Trifles', he added, 'however ridiculous, cease to be
trifles when they may interfere with a safe administration of the law,,.
. . .' Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a
black robe and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be
human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless
1947] 1309
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thinking machine." For obvious reasons the point becomes markedly
sharper when cases are tried by juries.
Never forget that courts do business at retail, not wholesale. All
decisions are specific decisions in specific suits. In advising a client
of his rights and duties, a lawyer is attempting to predict, to guess,
what decision will be rendered in a specific bit of litigation. Often that
requires him, before any suit is begun or even threatened, to guess
whether, should litigation arise, there will be a dispute about the facts,
and, if so, whether conflicting testimony will be introduced at the trial,
and what trial judge or jury will try the case, and what will be the re-
action of that as yet unknown trial judge or jury to that as yet unknown
testimony.
Prediction of specific decisions is hazardous, then, not primarily be-
cause of uncertainty about the legal rules but usually because of the
obstacles to guessing what the trial courts will guess to be the facts.
Due presumably to the difficulty of such guessing, Learned Hand, our
greatest American judge, declared, after a long period on the trial
bench, "I must say that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond
almost anything else short of sickness and death." 12 Sir William Eg-
gleston, the-present Australian Ambassador, an experienced trial law-
yer, wrote this year, "With regard to the trial of pure questions of fact, I
am of opinion that the results are .. .much a matter of chance." 13
Because, fixing their attention on upper courts, they neglect that
crucial aspect of court-house government, many leading law teachers
do their maximum worst in gravely miseducating their students. Re-
peatedly they assert that clear and precise legal rules usually prevent
litigation, and imply that the difficulty of predicting decisions stems
largely from uncertainty in or about the rules. That amounts to say-
ing that if all the legal rules were settled and precise, or if parties to
controversies always could agree on the pertinent rules, there would
be little orno litigation. That is pure, unadulterated tosh. In most suits,
no disagreement arises about the rules, and the disputes relate solely
to the facts. Decisions in such suits, says many a professor, quoting
Cardozo, leave "jurisprudence . ..untouched." 14 That is true, pro-
vided you so conceive of "jurisprudence" that it stays aloof from the
affairs of ordinary men. But such a decision often means death or
imprisonment or poverty or a ruined life to some mere mortal who, in
his benighted ignorance, has more regard for his own welfare than
for the aesthetic delights of pure "jurisprudence."
12. HAND, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Mlafer in 3 LEc'ruRE~s
ON LEGAL Topics 89, 105 (1926).
13. Eggleston, Legal Development I) A Modern Comnnoity, in INTERPRTATIONS OF"
MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 167, 188 (1947).
14. See quotations from and discussions of certain of Cardozo's writings in FRANIC,
IF MEN WE= ANGELS 284-95 (1942).
[Vol. 56: 13031310
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Uncertainty about some of the legal rules exists; one comes upon it
in the "marginal" (or "unprovided" or "new" cases). Cardozo cor-
rectly said that such uncertainty ought not to be exaggerated. How-
ever, the point he missed, because he was an upper-court lawyer or an
upper-court judge during most of his career, is this: The major cause
of legal uncertainty, which is vast in extent, inheres in the unknow-
ability of the "facts" of cases. 11 For I repeat that few cases are ap-
pealed and that, even when a case is appealed, the upper court usually
accepts the facts as found by the trial court. Appellate courts deal
principally with the legal rules. For that reason upper courts are rela-
tively unimportant. Trial courts-trial judges and juries-are the
pivotal factor in the judicial process.
In 1937, when I was still a practicing lawyer, I spoke at Harvard
Law School to some six hundred law students. I talked about govern-
ment and "economics." One of the Harvard professors had previously
objected, urging me, instead, to talk about my experiences in litiga-
tion. I told the students of that suggestion, but said I had refused to
comply with it because, while what I might tell about litigation might
be amusing to them, my remarks would be as remote from their knowl-
edge as if I were to talk about head-hunting in the Solomon Islands.
To test out the validity of that comment, I asked all those students who
had ever been in a court-room to raise their hands. Ten of the six hun-
dred did so. I then asked which of those ten had visited a trial since
he had been in law school. Five raised their hands. I then asked how
many had been urged by their professors to attend trials. Not a single
student raised his hand. I made similar experiments last year at both
Columbia and Yale, with substantially the same result.
If it were not for a tradition which blinds us, would we not consider
it ridiculous that, -with litigation laboratories just around the comer,
law schools confine their students to hat they can learn about litiga-
tion in books? What would we say of a medical school where students
were taught surgery solely from the printed page? No one, if he could
do otherwise, would teach the art of playing golf by having the teacher
talk about golf to the prospective player and having the latter read a
book relating to the subject. The same holds for toe-dancing, swim-
ming, automobile-driving, hair-cutting, or cooking wild ducks. Is legal
practice more simple? Why should law teachers and their students be
more hampered than golf teachers and their students? Who would
learn golf from a golf instructor, contenting himself with sitting in the
locker-room analyzing newspaper accounts of important golf-matches
that had been played by someone else several years before? Why should
law teachers be like Tomlinson? " 'This I have read in a book', he said,
15. Id. at 284-94, 301-7.
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'and this was told to me, and this I have thought that another man
thought of a Prince in Muscovy.' "
Legal practice is an art, a fairly difficult one. Why make its teaching
more indirect, more roundabout, more baffling and difficult than teach-
ing golf? But that is what the Langdell method has done. Legal teach-
ing would be no "cinch" at best. The Langdell method has increased
the difficulties, has made the task of the teacher as complicated as
possible. Even the teacher who is a genius cannot overcome the ob-
stacles. When I was at law school I sat next to a Chinese student who
had learned his English in Spain. As a consequence, when he took his
notes on what the American professors said, he took them in Spanish.
On inquiry, I ascertained that he actually thought them in Chinese.
University law teaching today is involved in a process not unlike that.
It is supposed to teach men what they are to do in court-rooms and law
offices. What the student sees is a reflection in a badly-made mirror of
a reflection in a badly-made mirror of what is going on in the work-a-
day life of lawyers. Why not smash the mirrors? Why not have the
students directly observe the subject-matter of their study, with the
teachers acting as enlightened interpreters of what is thus observed?
As you will see in a moment, I am not advocating a plan for legal
education which will produce mere legal technicians. It is imperative
that lawyers be made who are considerably more than that. That
"1more "is alien to the Langdell spirit. That spirit, I grant you, is some-
what weakened. The undiluted Langdell principles are nowhere in
good repute today. But they are still the basic ingredient of legal peda-
gogy, so that, whatever else is mixed with them, the dominant flavor
is still Langdellian. Our leading law schools are still library-law schools,
book-law schools. They are not, as they should be, lawyer-schools.
The history of American legal education commenced with the ap-
prentice system: The prospective lawyer "read law" in the office of a
practicing lawyer. Daily he saw for himself what courts and lawyers
were doing. Before his eyes, legal theories received constant tests
in legal practice. Even if he did not always articulate the discrepancies
between theory and, practice, he felt them. The first American law
school, founded by Judge Reeves in the 1780's, was merely the ap-
prentice system on a group basis. The students were still in intimate
daily contact with the courts and law offices.
To shorten a long story, legal apprenticeship, A la Reeves or other-
Wise, all but disappeared in the universities under the impact of Lang-
dellism, as school after school quarantined its students in the library.
Some twenty-five years ago, however, the university law schools began
to haV b. troubled conscience. Why, they asked, does what we teach
as "law" so little resemble "law" as practiced? The question and the
troubled conscience yielded something labelled "sociological jurispru-
dence." Its watch-word was that "law" is one of the "social sciences."
[Vol. 56: 13031312
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All, then, would be well if legal education meshed with sociology, his-
tory, ethics, economics and political science. That became the great
new dispensation.
It was all to the good, as far as it went. But it did not bring the
schools back on the track from which they had fatefully strayed under
Langdell's neurotic wizardry. If you Nant to go from New York to
San Francisco, you're not likely to get there soon by voyaging to Rio
de Janeiro. Maybe you should go to Rio, even if your ultimate des-
tination is 'Frisco; for, when you arrive in 'Frisco, you'll be a wiser
citizen, thanks to the knowledge gained on that detour. But if your
final goal is 'Frisco, then 'Frisco ought to be somewhere on your itir er-
ary. On the itinerary of most university law schools you'll find no
mention of a trip, not even of a side-trip, to the court-house or to real
everyday lawyerdom. The student's travels consist alr ost entirely of
detours.
The sole way for these law schools to get back on the main track is
unequivocally to repudiate Langdell's morbid repudiation of actual
legal practice, to brirg the students into intimate contact with courts
and lawyers. That simple, obvious step the university law schools have
shunned as if courts and lawyers would infect students with intelle-tual
bubonic plague. These schools have been devising the most cornpli-
cated ways to avoid taking that step; instead of marching straight up
to lawyerdom, they have walked all around it. They have been like a
man who reaches with his right hand around behind his neck to scratch
his left ear. As a result of present teaching methods, law students are
like future horticulturists who restrict their studies to cut flowers. They
are like prospective dog-breeders who never see anything but stuffed
dogs. Perhaps there is a correlation between that kind of legal educa-
tion and the overproduction of stuffed shirts in the legal profession.
I maintain that something of immense worth was lost when our lead-
ing law schools wholly abandoned the legal apprentice system. I do
not for a moment suggest that we return to that old system in its old
form. But is it not plain that, without giving up entirely the case-book
method and without discarding the invaluable alliance with the so-
called "social sciences," our law schools should once more bring them-
selves into close contact with what clients need and what courts and
lawyers actually do? Should the schools not execute an about-face?
Should they not now adopt Judge Reeves' 18th century apprentice-
school method, modifying it in the light of the w\isdom gained on the
long detour?
Let me now be more specific. I present the following ideas for con-
sideration:
First: A considerable proportion of teachers in any law school should
be men with not less than five to ten years of varied ex-perierce in ac-
tual legal practice. They should have had work in trial courts, appel-
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late courts, before administrative agencies, in office-work, in dealing
with clients, in negotiations, in arbitrations. Their practical experience
should not have been confined chiefly to a short period of paper work
in a law office. I do not mean that there are not some highly capable
teachers with little or no such practical experience; some such teachers,
who are brilliantly intuitive, partially make up for their deficiencies by
imaginative insight. Nor do I say that mere experience in legal prac-
tice will make a man a good law teacher. By and large, teachers are
born, not made.
There is room in any school for the mere book-teacher. Part of the
job of the lawyers is to write briefs for appellate courts. Brief-writing
in part does employ "library-law." The exclusively book-lawyer is
perhaps at his best in teaching such "library-law." But the "library-
law" teacher should cease to dominate the schools. More than that,
some of the teaching of the art of "persuasive reasoning" in briefs might
well be done by men who have written many real briefs for real courts.
Unfortunately, attempted reform of legal pedagogy is frequently in
the hands of the "library-law" teacher. With the best will in the world,
such a teacher often finds it almost impossible to warp over the old so-
called case-system so as to adapt it to the needs of the future practicing
lawyer. So long as teachers who know little or nothing except what
they learned from books under that case-system control a law school,
the actualities of the lawyer's life are there likely to be considered pe-
ripheral and as of secondary importance. A medical school dominated
by teachers who had seldom seen a patient, or diagnosed the ailments
of flesh-and-blood human beings, or actually performed surgical opera-
tions, would not be likely to turn out doctors equipped with a fourth
part of what doctors ought to know. But our law schools are not doing
for their students even the equivalent of that shoddy job. Many of
those schools are so staffed that they are best fitted, not to train law-
yers, but to graduate men able to become book-law teachers who can
educate still other students to become book-law teachers-and so on
ad infinitum, world without end. They are, in large part, excellent book-
law-teacher schools. Because many law school professors have cut
themselves off from the realities of a lawyer's life, because viewing
these realities from too great a distance, they are class-room lawyers,
one might say that they teach what they call law "through a class
darkly."
As I have already intimated, the spirit of Langdell so dominates
many a university law school that even the practitioner who becomes
a teacher in such a school often succumbs to that spirit and forgets the
difference betveen the theory he is teaching and the actual practice
he has previously encountered. In some instances, to be sure, this for-
getfulness stems from the character of the individual teacher; he may
have found practice distasteful and lacking in that certainty which he
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craved, so that he shifts with delight to a system in which far greater
(but illusory) certainty seems to be a reality.
What I suggest, then, is not that all law professors should have had
first-hand contacts with courts, lawyers and clients, but that a very
large proportion of the professors should be men with such a past.
Second: The case-system, so far as it is retained, should be revised
so that it will in truth and fact become a case-system and not a mere
sham case-system. A few of the current type of so-called case-books
should be retained to teach dialectic skill in brief-writing. But the
study of cases which will lead to some small measure of real understand-
ing of how suits are won, lost and decided, should be based to a very
marked extent on reading and analysis of complete records of cases-
beginning with the filing of the first papers, through the trial in the
trial court and to and through the upper courts; A few months properly
spent on one or two elaborate court records, including the briefs (ard
supplemented by reading of text-books as well as upper court opinions),
will teach a student more than two years spent on going through twenty
of the case-books now in use. In medical schools, "case histories" are
used for instruction. But they are far more complete than the alleged
case-books used in law schools. It is absurd that we should continue
to call an upper court opinion a case. It is at most an adjunct to the
final step in a case (i. e., an essay published by an upper court in ex-
planation of its decision).
Third: But even if legal case-books were true case-books and as
complete as medical case-histories, they would be insufficient as tools
for study. At best, dissection of court records would merely approxi-
mate the cadavers which first-year medical students learn to dissect.
What would we think of a medical school in which students studied no
more than what was to be found in printed case-histories, and were
deprived of all clinical experience until after they received their M. D.
degrees? Our law schools must learn from our medical schools. Law
students should be given the opportunity to see legal operations. Their
study of cases, at the veriest minimum, should be supplemented by
frequent visits, accompanied by law teachers, to both trial and appel-
late courts. The cooperation of judges could easily be enlisted. (In the
days of the Year Books the judges went out of their way, at tirres, to
instruct law students who were present in the courtrcom. If Lagdell
had but taken that hint when he was sighing for the days of the Planta-
genets!)
The "up-stage" attitude of the bookish-trained teacher towards in-
struction in the actualities of trial-practice is prettily illustrated in the
following excerpt from The Centennial History of Harvard Law School:
"Efforts have been made from time to time to give students some ex-
perience in the trial of cases by substituting a trial of the facts before
a jury for the argument of questions of law, whether in the law clubs
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or in the . . .moot court. Interesting experiments have been made
in acting out a legal injury and summoning the witnesses of the
event to testify; and on the other hand in coaching witnesses on the
points of actual testimony in their reported trial and having them re-
produce the testimony in the Practice Court. Such experiments have
been more successful in affording amusement than in substantial benefit
to the participants. A fact trial now and then is well worth while, but
only as a relief to the tedium of serious work." 16
One cannot but agree, in part, with that writer. Such fake trials are
poor substitutes for careful observation of actual trials. Would any
medical school substitute pretend-surgical-operations for real opera-
tions as means for instructing students? Obviously such sham law
school trials can do little more than "afford amusement" or serve "as
a relief to tedium." They are not the equivalent of serious lawyer-work.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Douglas, formerly Professor
Douglas, agrees with me on this score.
Fourth: Now I come to a point which I consider of first importance.
I have stated that law schools could learn much from the medical
schools. The parallel cannot be carried too far. But a brief scrutiny of
medical education suggests the use of a device which may be employed
as an adequate method of obtaining apprentice work for law students:
Medical schools rely to a very large extent on the free medical clinics
and dispensaries. There now exist legal clinics in the offices of the Legal
Aid Society. Today, however, those offices are by no means the coun-
terpart of the medical clinics and dispensaries. The ablest physicians
devote a considerable portion of their time to medical clinics, while the
Legal Aid Society is, on the whole, staffed by men who are r.ot leaders of
their profession. The Society, too, is limited in the kinds of cases it
takes, and the law teachers have little, if any, direct contact with its
efforts.
Suppose, however, that there were, in each law school, a legal clinic
or dispensary. As before indicated, a considerable part of (but not
necessarily all) the teaching staff of a law school should consist of law-
yers who already have varied experience in practice. Some of these
men could run the law school legal clinics assisted by the students. The
work of these clinics would be done for little or no charge. The teacher-
clinicians would devote their full time to their teaching, which would
include such clinical work (although they would also teach other mat-
ters). The law school clinics, however, would not confine their activi-
ties to such as are now undertaken by the Legal Aid Society. They
would take on important jobs, including trials, for governmental agen-
cies, legislative committees, or other quasi-public bodies. Their profes-
sional work would thus comprise virtually every kind of service ren-
16. CENT=NNIAL HISTORY OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 84-5 (1918).
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dered by law offices. The teacher-clinicians would disclose to their
student assistants, both in and out of "office hours," the generalized
aspects of the specific doctrines pertinent to the specific cases with
which they dealt. Theory and practice would thus constantly inter-
lace. The students would learn to observe the true relation between
the contents of upper-court opinions and the work of practicing lawyers
and courts. The students would be made to see, among other things,
the human side of the administration of justice, including the following:
(a) The hazards of a jury trial: How juries decide cases. The irra-
tional factors that frequently count with juries. The slight effect which
the judges' instructions concerning the legal rules often have on ver-
dicts.
(b) How legal rights are affected by lost papers, missing witnesses,
perjury and prejudice.
(c) The effects of fatigue, alertness, political pull, graft, laziness,
conscientiousness, patience, biases and open-mindedness of judges. How
legal rights may vary with the judge who tries the case and with that
judge's varying and often unpredictable reactions to various kinds of
cases and divers kinds of witnesses.
(d) The student would learn that, except fictionally, in trials there
is no such thing, for instance, as the "law of torts" as distinguished
from specific decisions; and that all legal rules, including the "substan-
tive" rules, in a fundamental sense are procedural, since they are only
some among the many implements lawyers use in the court-room fights
we call "litigation." 17
Participating in the preparation of briefs, both for trial courts and
on appeals, the student, with the aid of his teachers, would learn legal
rules and doctrines in the exciting context of live cases. The difference
is indescribable between that way of learning and that to which stu-
dents are now restricted in the schools. It is like the difference between
kissing a girl and reading a treatise on osculation. Abstract theory di-
vorced from concrete practical interests is usually dull. Montessori dis-
covered that to teach half-witted children arithmetic became easy, if they
were given practical activities, interesting to them, in which adding,
subtracting and multiplying were necessary aids to the desired
specific achievements. They learned by "doing." If that method is
good for half-wits, why not for law students (who are presumably
whole-wits)?
(e) Again, in a living context, the student in my sort of apprentice
school would be instructed in the methods used in negotiating contracts
and settlements of controversies.
17. See FRANK, IF MEN WE ANGELs 81-2, 100 (1942); cf. In re Fried 161 F.2d
453, 464 (C.C.A2d 1947), and the brilliant paper by Miss Silving, Law and Fact in the
Light of the Piwe Theory of Law, in INTmPErn-,TATIOxS oF MoDzw-; Lrm. Pnumosopnlms
642 (1947).
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(f) The nature of draftsmanship would become clearer. The student
would understand how the lawyer tries to translate the wishes of a
client (often inadequately expressed by the client) into wills, contracts
or corporate instruments. The university law schools even now can,
and some do, accomplish something in the way of teaching draftsman-
ship. That is, they can do something in the way of showing the students
how to draft mortgages or wills or deposit agreements (or the like)
which have a more or less stereotyped form. But "creAtive draftsman-
ship"-the use of novel fact-materials thrown at the lawyer by his
client and sometimes worked out in negotiations with counsel repre-
senting the other party to the bargain-cannot be adequately taught
in most university law schools as they are now conducted.
(g) In such a school, what I call the "enforcement approach" could
soon dawn on the students. That is, they would perceive that in advis-
ing a client as to whether he should bring a suit, it may be well to begin
with the projected end, to find out what the client wants, and then to
ascertain whether by a law suit he can obtain it. For instance, if a man
owes a client $5,000, but the man is hopelessly insolvent or all his as-
sets are judgment-proof, litigation will be fruitless. 18
(h) Concern with the pressing practical affairs of clients would also
induce close-up study of the legislative process in action. The student
would be prodded into learning how legislation is made, would come
to know the realities behind the "legislative intention" or the "purpose
of the legislature."
I will be told-I have been told-that the law schools at most have
but three short years to train lawyers, and that these years are already
so crowded that there is no time to spend bn the sort of first-hand mate-
rial to which I have been referring. I am not at all impressed by such
talk. For in most university law schools the major part of the three
years is spent in teaching a relatively simple technique-that of ana-
lyzing upper court opinions, "distinguishing cases," constructing, modi-
fying or criticizing legal doctrines. Three years is much too long for
that job. Intelligent men can learn that dialectical technique in about
six months. Teach them the dialectic devices as applied to one or two
legal topics, and they will have no trouble applying them to other top-
ics. But in the law schools, much of the three years is squandered, by
bored students, in applying that technique over and over again-and
never with reference to a live client or a real law suit-to a variety of
subject-matters: torts, contracts, corporations, trusts, suretyship, ne-
gotiable instruments, evidence, pleading, and so on. Of course, it is
impossible in three years, or indeed in thirty-three years, to give or
take courses, in all the subjects into which what is compendiously called
18. The student would thus better comprehend the practical significance of executions,
supplementary proceedings, bankruptcy, reorganizations, etc.
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"law" can be subdivided. If you measure the limited number of courses
that can be covered in three years over against the totality of subject-
matters which a lawyer, when engaged in general practice, will encoun-
ter, three years seem all too brief. But the point is that the able lav.yer,
if he has once mastered the dialectic technique in respect of one ortwo
subject matters, can in short order become adept in coping with a great
variety of subject-matters. Teach a man the use of stare decisis devices
with respect to the so-called law of contracts or trusts, and he will have
little trouble in applying those devices with respect to corporations,
insurance, or what-not.
The myopic "case system" necessarily limits the student to study of
a limited portion of a very few subjects. It seems absurd to me that
students should not be required to read textbooks and legal encyclo-
pedia articles, not only on those few subjects, but on several dozen
others. By that means they will attain a general nodding acquaintance
with the leading concepts and peculiar vocabularies of a variety of
special topics. Thus they will, for example, overcome that silly dread,
experienced by many a graduate, of legal problems concerning patents,
copyrights, and admiralty.
Some sixteen years ago, Judge Crane of the New York Court of Ap-
peals characterized the typical graduate of a university law school as
follows: "With the practical working of the law he has little or no famil-
iarity. He may come to the bar almost ignorant of how the law should
be applied and is applied in daily life. It is, therefore, not unusual to
find the brightest student the most helpless practitioner, and the most
learned surpassed in the profession by one who does not know half as
much. Strange as it may seem, there were some advantages in the older
methods of preparation for the bar. As you know, the law school is rela-
tively a matter of recent growth. Formerly, a student, working in the of-
fice of a practitioner, combined the study of law with its daily applica-
tion to the troubles and business of clients. He had an opportunity of
hearing the story at the beginning, of noticing how it was handled
by his preceptor, of reading the papers prepared to obtain a remedy;
he accompanied the lawyer to court and became acquainted with the
manner of the presentation of the case to the judge or to the jury ...
You know much more law after coming out of a university [law school]
than these former students ever knew, but you know less about the
method of its application, and how to handle and use it." 11
Is that not a shocking state of affairs? Think of a medical school
which would turn out graduates ignorant of how medicine "should be
applied and is applied in daily life." In this connection it is important,
to note that, according to Flexner, in the best-equipped medical schools,
19. Quoted in Frank, Why Not a Clinical LawVer-School?, 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 907,
919 (1933).
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the student "makes and sees made through physical examinations,
painstaking records, varied and thoroughgoing laboratory tests, at every
stage in the study of the patient; the literature of the subject is utilized;
at one and the same time medicine is practiced and studied-teachers
and students mingling freely and naturally in both activities." In this
manner, said Flexner, there has been "effected the fusion of bedside
and laboratory procedures alike in the care of patients, in teaching, and
in research. . . . From the standpoint of training, fragmentariness,
if stimulative and formative, is desirable rather than otherwise ...
The student must . . . acquire a vivid sense of the existence of breaks,
gaps, and problems. The clinics I am now discussing carry him from
the patient in the bed to the point beyond which at the moment neither
clinical observation nor laboratory investigation can carry him. There
he is left, in possession, it is to be hoped, of an acute realization of the
relatively narrow limits of human knowledge and human skill, and of
the pressing enigmas yet to be solved by intelligence and patience." 20
Here is much that law schools should ponder carefully. The Langdell
system is their albatross. They should cast it off.
The core of the law school I propose would be a sort of sublimated law
office. Those who attended it would learn by "doing", not merely by
reading and talking about doings. But such a school would not limit
itself to instruction in legal techniques. It would consider "strictly
legal problems" in the light supplied by the other social studies (mis-
called "social sciences")-history, ethics, economics, politics, psychol-
ogy and anthropology. Mere pre-legal courses in those fields, uncon-
nected with the live material of human actions with which lawyers
must cope, have proved a failure. The integration ought to be achieved
inside the law schools. Some of the teachers who give those courses
need not have been practicing lawyers, indeed need not be lawyers at
all. Most of the synthesis, however, between the instruction in legal
techniques and in those other wider perspectives should occur in the
courses relating to legal subjects. Accordingly, all the teachers should
be men who have themselves made that synthesis.
I may say that, more than twenty years ago, I was one of a group
of alumni who pleaded with the University of Chicago Law School thus
to widen its curriculum. Far, then, from rejecting the notion of teach-
ing subjects not directly "legal," I would extend such teaching. I
would, in addition, show (as I try to do in my own teaching) the con-
nections between legal philosophy and other phases of philosophy.
Noting that a trial judge or jury is a kind of historian, I would also
show the resemblances and differences between the methods-the log-
ics-of the natural scientists, the historians and the lawyers. 211 would
'20. A. FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION 269-70 (1925).
21. As to the judge as historian, see In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 462 (C.C.A2d 1947).
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give a first-rate course in logic and semantics. 22 For example, apropos
of the distinction between so-called "substantive law" and "proce-
dure," I would explore the concept of "substance" in philosophy and
science. I would have students study the several varieties of psychol-
ogy as related to the problems of lawyers and judges, including the
psychology of judges, juries, witnesses and litigants.
If I had my own way I would point to the error of determinism, eco-
nomic or otherwise; 23 1 would indicate the lack of foundation for cyc-
lical theories of history, such as Toynbee's and Spengler's; 24 I would
show the intertwining of the legal notion of "natural law" and the
notion of "laws of nature"; 25 1 would severely criticize "behavior-
ism"; 216 I would get Max Radin to write an article on the relation of
the history of the legal concept of "cause" to the idea of "causation"
in physics.
An interest in the practical should not preclude, on the contrary it
should invite, a lively interest in theory. For practices unavoidably
blossom into theories, and most theories induce practices, good or bad.
Like M. Jourdain who was surprised to learn that all his life he'd been
talking prose, so those "practical lawyers" who decry legal theory as
frivolous are, despite themselves, legal theorists, legal philosophers.
But their philosophies, their theories, are usually inarticulate, so that
they delude themselves and surrender in practice to their own unex-
amined, uncriticized principles. 27
SO-CALLED "IEALISie" AND LEGAL EDUCATION
A lawyer's legal philosophy affects his attitudes toward legal educa-
tion. It may therefore be asserted (1) that my educational proposals
link upwith the fact that I am a so-called "legal realist," from which
it must follow (2) that my educational proposals suffer from the per-
nicious moral and intellectual maladies said to be common to all the
"realists." For, despite the lack of homogeneity among that group of
non-Euclidean legal thinkers unfortunately labelled "legal realists," 2
22. See, e.g., FRaxx, FATE AND FaEn om cc. 1, 2, 1'" 14, and apps. 4 and 5 (1945).
23. Id., passim.
24. Id. at 37-8.
25. Id. at 115-42. As to the problem posed to "natural law" advocates by the sub-
jectivity of fact-finding, see Frank, Sketch of an Influence, in I NrTrxnroz-s oy MOD-
= LEGA. PHIOSOPHIEs 189, 234-7 (1947).
26. Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 233 (1931).
27. See FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEoRY 250-1 (1944); McKeon, The Philosophic Prob-
lem, in NEW PERSPEC TES ON P.AcE 196 (1944) ; Frank, Book Reviews, 59 Hnv. L. RV.
1004 (1946).
28. As to the unfortunate nature of that label, see Fnaxs, IF MEN ,VEWn Auaus
276-7 (1942); Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. or PA. L Rev. 233, 25S and n. 69
(1931).
As to the lack of homogeneity of the "realist" group, see Fn.;s., IF MEN ,Vns-
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critics have repeatedly leveled blanket charges of moral obtuseness
and intellectual stupidity against them all. 29 Those charges Northrop
restated in 1946 as follows: The "realists" are narrow-visioned unedu-
cated positivists who think "all theoretical principles are .. .myths,"
and who act on the "erroneous assumption that experimentation and
an appeal to what happens in practice, without guiding theoretical
principles, are alone what matters in science and life"; they deem "the-
ory and principles irrelevant"; considering themselves "scientific," they
nevertheless face social problems "without the knowledge or apprecia-
tion of the role of theory in realistic scientific method necessary" to
understand and grapple intelligently with problems. As a result (so
the indictment continues) they have no awareness of the distinction
between "problems of value" and "problems of fact," and, in their in-
credible ignorance, confusing "the 'ought' of society with the 'is,I" they
lack all interest in the importance of the quest for "normative social
theory," and cannot intelligently pose or answer questions as to "how
we can alter facts" in order to "produce a more ideal state of affairs."
Thus (the indictment goes on) they believe that "ideological issues
can be resolved and the principles defining what is good in legal and
social action can be found merely by observing what is in fact the case
with respect to the behavior of judges and people generally"; so it came
about that, in the New Deal administration, when advising concerning
governmental and economic affairs, they fooled themselves and their
advisees by "allowing value judgments, smuggled surreptitiously into
the empirical evidence, to determine their legal opinions and prescrip-
tions...." 3o
Now it happens that among the "realists" who played outstanding
roles as New Deal advisers were William 0. Douglas and Walton Ham-
ilton. The palpable absurdity of the blanket charges, summarized
above, could easily be demonstrated by citing the achievements and
quoting from the writings of either of those men. Since, however, the
"realict" with whom I am best acquainted is myself, I shall-not at all
out of egotism but solely out of laziness-use myself as a guinea-pig.
In 1932, replying to such charges, I wrote, "All those known as legal
realists .. .are eager-perhaps altogether too eager-to improve the
judicial system, to make it more efficient, more responsive to social
needs, more 'just'. . . . They are unflagging idealists. . . But where
ANGELS 277-9, 284 (1942) ; Frank, Are Judges Humnant, 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 233, 263-4
(1931); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. Riv. 1222, 1233-56
(1931).
29. See, e.g., FULLER, THE LANV IN QUEST OF ITSELF 5-64 (1940); Fuller, Aincricau
Legal Realism, 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 429 (1934); Kennedy, Realism What Nextf, 8
FORD. L. REv. 44, 75 n. 110 (1939); Pound, Modernt Administrative LaV, 51 VA. BAR
Ass'N PROCEEDINGs 372, 384-5 (1939).
30. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST 152, 187-8, 255, 258-9 (1946).
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they differ from others who seek to change court-house ways is in this
important respect :They insist that no program for change can be intel-
ligent if it is uninformed, if it is not based on moderately accurate
knowledge of what has happened and is happening, and on informed
guesses as to what can be made to happen. They believe that the way
to attain ideals is not by merely assuming that those ideals are now
operative or easily attainable, but by painstaking study of what is now
going on (thereby learning something of what can be made to go on
thereafter)." 31 Previously I had written, "To decry, as we have done,
the quest in law of the demonstrably unattainable does not mean that
we advocate giving up 'ideals' in law. What the law ought to be con-
stitutes, rightfully, no small part of the thinking of lawyers and judges.
Such thinking should not be diminished, but augmented. . . . But
there is a nice difference between ideals or ('oughts') and illusions. The
approximately possible differs from vain hopes founded on unprofit-
able day-dreaming. Such day-dreaming, often, indeed, prevents the
pursuit of the possible .... 32 Wishes impossible of realization are
frivolous. . . .And ethical attitudes towards law must conform to
possibilities and feasibilities. 'Oughts' must be based on 'ises' and
'cans'. " 33
VALUES AND POLICIES
Entertaining such views, of course I thoroughly agree ith those
who, like Professors Lasswell and McDougal, urge that law schools
should emphasize democratic values and ideals, and should stimulate
future lawyers to think of themselves in the role of makers of policies
which will implement such values. 31
31. Frank, Mr. Justice Holnes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 Co".. L. Q.
568, 586 (1932).
32. Attention is called to the invaluable "dreaming" phases of creative activities in
FRA-Kr, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 169 (1930). See, infra, as to "thinkful wishing;"
see also, as to "wish postulates," FRANK, IF MEN WEn A?;o.s 119, 364-5 (1942);
Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinhing, 17 Co.. L.Q. 568, 584-5
(1932) ; cf. FRANx, FATE AND FREEDom 200-1 (1945).
33. FRANx, LAW AND THE MODERN 'MIND 168, 361-2 (1931). That book vms written
before I had learned to be cautious about using the word "law." For answers, by parsons
other than "realists," to criticism of the charge that "realists" are uninterested in and ig-
norant of "values" and "ideals," see Kessler, Theoretic Bases of Law, 9 U. oF CnL L RE.
98, 109 (1941) ; Kessler, Aratural Law, Justice and Democracy, 19 TuL.-m L. RE%. 32
(1944) ; McDougal, Fuller v. the American Legal Realists, 50 YALE L J., 827 (1941).
34. See Lasswell and 'McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203 (1943). To cherish those values is to
repudiate the notion, a la Plato, that university law students are to constitute an .ite,
versed in methods of "manipulating symbols," according to their appraisal of contempo-
rary "mass psychology," for the public good. See Frank, Editorial, Self-Guardianship and
Democracy, 16 AMERICAN SCHOLAR 265 (Summer, 1947). For a recent espousal of the
"useful lie" as an indispensable instrument of social control, see Bum, HAM, Ta MAclilA-
vzLLIANs 269 and passim (1943).
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But such a program must honestly and courageously face these con-
ditions: In a legal system, social values, ideals, policies, find their ex-
pression in legal rules, standards and principles (which, for conven-
ience, I have collectively called "rules"). A legal rule, I repeat, says,
"If the facts are thus and so, then the legal consequences are this and
that." Now, .whatever otherwise may be the effect of such rules
on the community's mores, yet, so far as the courts are concerned, those
policies and ideals become operative chiefly in one direct way-through
specific decisions in specific law suits. A rule (enacted by a legislature
or judge-made) receives judicial enforcement in most cases only if a
trial court finds that the facts of a case are such as to invoke that rule.
If a trial court mistakenly finds the facts-i. e., finds facts markedly
different from the actual facts of the case-and, on that basis, invokes
and applies a given rule, then that rule is not really, but only seemingly,
operative, and the ideal or value it expresses is frustrated.
Let me illustrate: The rule against murder represents a minimal
ethical ideal. WArhen a trial court-judge or jury-finds an innocent
man guilty of murder and, as a result, he is hanged or jailed, patently
the ideal embodied in the rule against murder has tragically miscarried.
Less dramatic, but often equally tragic, is a non-criminal case in which,
as a result of mistakes in trial-court fact-finding, a man loses his sav-
ings, his property, his job, his reputation. The moral is that, no matter
how well-made the rule, no matter how significant the social policy it
articulates, that rule and that policy are, in truth, not judicially effec-
tive unless, in specific cases, the rule is applied to the actual facts, not
to erroneously conceived facts. Indeed, unless this happens, that rule
and that policy miscarry and may yield deplorable injustice. Thus
the efficacy of ideals and policies expressed in legal rules often depends
on fallible guesses by trial courts in specific law suits about the actual
past facts involved in those suits. 31
All of which means-what? It means that if law schools are to do
something more than to chatter about ideals and policies, if they aim
at ideals and policies in action, they must, at a minimum, teach how
those ideals and policies are being daily frustrated by defective trial-
court techniques, and must indicate what can be done to reform those
techniques. 11 For although lawyers who are good American citizens
share with other citizens the obligation to see that all phases of our
democratic government and economy work well, on the lawyers rests
a special moral responsibility to see to it that the courts approach as near
as is practically possible to justice and democracy in the trial of cases.
That calls for an overhauling of the jury system and for drastic altera-
35. See In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 462-5 (C.C.A. 2d 1947).
36. Compare Morgan, Book Review, 49 HARv. L. Rav. 1387, 1389 (1936); FaArN,
IF MEN WERE ANGELS 94 et seq., 109 et seq. (1942); Frank, Book Review, 56 YALn
L.J. 589, 593-4 (1947).
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lions in the rules of evidence, since otherise not only will the legal
rules continue to go into the ash-can (through jury ignorance or worse),
but evidentiary data indispensable for correct fact-finding will continue
to be excluded.
But it calls for much more. We proudly declaim the democratic slo-
gan of "equality before the law," yet too often that equality is lacking.
Here is what I have in mind: since most decisions turn on the facts,
and since the evidence presented at a trial presumably has some con-
siderable effect on what facts are "found" by the court, preparation or
lack of preparation, by way of ascertainment of the evidence before
tri l, will often spell victory or defeat. But frequently the procuring
of the most important evidence before trial requires expensive investi-
gation. It may necessitate hiring a detective, or an accountant, or an
engineer, or an appraiser, or a hand-writing expert. Accordingly, the
prospective litigant wzo has not the money to pay for such an investigation
is denied justice. 37
I haven't time here to explore that problem or to suggest possible
solutions. Liberal "discovery" rules cannot do the trick. Nor can the
Legal Aid Society or a law school "clinic," since neither of them will
have the funds (often considerable) to pay for the necessary pre-trial
investigations. The general line of advance is governmental assump-
tion of a larger responsibility in ensuring that no available important
evidence fails to be adduced, and a concomitant reduction of the pre-
sent fierceness of our contentious procedure. That such a notion is not
"radical" appears from the fact that such a proposal received the en-
dorsement of President Taft in 1926. 31
I earnestly suggest that a law school which really means business
about democratic ideals should interest itself mightily in that problem
-and in the related problem of the effect of corruption and political
pull on trial judges. A law school should tell its students about judi-
cial corruption, not of course in order that they may learn how to use
bribes or political pull, but for these obvious reasons: (1) Lawyers
should do what they can to help the public eliminate eradicable blights
on the judicial process. If such factors as dishonesty and political "fix-
ing" of cases are not included in the study of how courts function, what
chance is there of an intelligent attack on the problem of diminishing
the evil effect of such factors? (2) A lawyer should know which judges
are corrupt, or susceptible to political influence, so that, when possible,
he may keep his clients' cases from coming before those judges. I sus-
pect that law students hear little from their teachers concerning those
problems. They have doubtless, however, heard something of profes-
37. See Frank, White Collar Justice, SAT. EvE. PosT, July 17, 1943, p. 22.
38. See WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICLL Awnrxs tXvo 33, 59, 205 note, 207
(1929). See also FRANK, IF MEN WumE ANGE.S 123-7 (1942) ; In re Fried, 161 F.2d
453, 464 (C.C.A. 2d 1947).
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sional ethics. But that subject can be effectively taught only if the
students, while discussing the canons of legal ethics, have available
some first-hand observation of the ways in which lawyers' ethical prob-
lems arise and of the actual habits, the mores, of the bar.
Of course, the lawyer's interests should roam far beyond the court-
house aspect of government; but to say that is not to say that he should
submerge his interest in that aspect. Without a doubt, the "full role
of the lawyer in the community" compels recognition of "his impact
on policy-advising and policy-making," and he should therefore give
"imaginative consideration" to "the whole range of institutions.., that
can be created, improved, or rearranged for community values," 11
But, in our democrhcy, prominent among the vaunted community val-
ues is the right to a fair trial; and a legal education which does not vig-
orously stimulate the student's interest in that direction, while it may
deserve high praise for its general educational worth, is not a democratic
education for future lawyers. For, if lawyers do not cherish the values
of which courts peculiarly should. be the guardians, who will or can?
It is tempting to say today that the formulation of sound policies in
foreign affairs should wholly preoccupy all of us, lawyers and the rest,
because, absent such policies, our civilization, and with it our entire
domestic menage, will soon vanish. 40 Yet, just as we dare not abandon
sewage disposal while we debate world problems, we cannot afford to
put in parentheses our'concern with the functioning of our domestic
democracy; and that democracy will be sadly deficient unless our courts
function well.
Last year, when many of my students told me of their interest in
policy-making, I asked them just how they would go about that job.
Not one of them gave me anything but the foggiest answer. 41 One
answer would be to combine lawyers' know-how concerning the courts
with economic and political wisdom (and well-thought-out surveys of
the future) in the drafting of statutes or of workable administrative
regulations likely to stand up in the courts.
Let me give you one concrete illustration of the way in which prac-
tical lawyer know-how may vitally affect policy. In 1935 37, the con-
stitutionality of the PWA statute was under attack in litigation in the
federal courts. When I entered that litigation for the Government,
39. McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Rcalimn To Policy Sci-
ence in the World Community, 56 YALE L. J. 1345, 1348 (1947).
40. "We should achieve a positive pity," wrote Anatole France, "for economists
arguing with one another about the cost of the furniture in a burning house." "[A] domes-
tic policy is in itself a secondary matter.... Yes, we must minimize domestic policies. A
crisis which tears the whole world apart must be met on a world scale." Camus, Neither
Victin.s Nor Executioners, PoLiTrcs, No. 4, pp. 141, 145 (1947).
41. One of them replied that he would inject a new approach to policy by inserting
a footnote in a brief. Another said that, if a client proposed to do something he, as a
lawyer, considered undesirable, he would advise against it.
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I found that the cases were on appeal. They had not been tried on
evidence, because my book-lawyer predecessor had demurred to the
complaints, thereby admitting the factual allegations made by the
plaintiffs in those complaints. Those admitted allegations were to the
effect that the PWA Administrator, Harold Ickes, had, in dozens of
ways, shockingly misused his powers under the statute. I feared, and
I convinced the Solicitor General, Stanley Reed (now Mr. Justice
Reed), that, with those facts admitted, the defense of the statute's
validity was in danger, since there would be such a bad atmosphere
as to arouse marked hostility on the part of even the most liberal
Justices when the cases were argued in the Supreme Court. Through
considerable maneuvering, we managed to have the suits remanded,
by several circuit courts, to the district courts for trial. We won
those trials, obtaining findings of fact, based on the evidence, which
flatly contradicted the plaintiffs' factual allegations, thus completely
dissipating the bad atmosphere. Then in the Supreme Court we were
victorious. I strongly suspect that, but for those trial tactics, PXWA
and the valuable policy it represented would have been judicially de-
stroyed.
Trial-court fact-finding is exceedingly difficult. 42 It can never be
perfect. But it can be much improved. Today it is defective to a trag-
ically needless extent. The law schools, due to their bookishness, largely
neglect it. 43 Even their courses in procedure, practice and evidence
are usually restricted to what upper courts have said on those subjects.
APPRENTICE SYSTEm AND THE TEACHERS
When in 1931 1 first broached my idea of a revised apprentice system,
the university law teachers sneered at it. More recently, some of them
have taken it somewhat more seriously. But they still, most of them,
refuse to consider apprenticeship as the central part of the law school
curriculum. Here, for example, is my good friend, Professor Karl
Llewellyn, who has one of the best seminal minds in the law school
world. As early as 1930 he confessed to his students in some lectures,
published as The Bramble Bush, that he was deficent as a teacher be-
cause of his lack of knowledge of the doings of trial courts, which he ad-
mitted were the guts of the whole judicial process. So what? So in 1935-
36, Llewellyn took a long journey with an anthropologist, from New
York to the West, to study the legal system of the Cheyenne Indians.
Then he and the anthropologist wrote a stimulating book about it. 44
But by spending a few nickels on subway fares from Columbia Law
42. See United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942-3 (CC.A. 2d 1942).
43. Much the same can be said of the "procedural reformers." See In re Fried, 161
F.2d 453, 462 (C.CA. 2d 1947).
44. LLEWILLYN AND HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE VAY (1941).
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School to lower New York City, he could have studied the trial courts
of that city, and could have written a book on the anthropology of
Tammany-Hall Indians-many of whom are first-rate trial judges.
In 1935, Llewellyn, referring in part to what I had previously written,
published an article 45 in which he said: "Let us concede that practice-
courts have thus far been successes only in the hands of notable teach-
ers. Let us concede that the artificiality of the atmosphere is too great
for most instructors to overcome. What of that? There remains the
.fact that law school is needlessly abstract, and needlessly removed
from life. There remains the fact that seeing-it-done gives reading-it-
in-books new flavor, new perspective. If one afternoon a week, during
one semester of one year, were free of other classes, and the students
with an instructor should visit various courts; if written critiques of
what had been observed were followed by the instructor's comment
and criticism; if the lawyers concerned were invited to explain their
own views on their strategy. Or if law schools would deliberately set
to work to plan an interstitial apprenticeship." He went on to propose
"post-school apprenticeship." But as yet he has done nothing about
either of those projects. 46
My friend Professor Simpson, erstwhile of Harvard, now at New
York University, in an article written with Miss Field, published in
in April of this year, dubbed legal apprentice education "nostalgic,"
and described it as an effort to "turn back the clock." In a footnote
(resulting from a criticism I made of his piece before publication), he
added that a "clinical approach is indispensable to any realistic pro-
gram" of legal education. But he says he would put it off until after
graduation from law school. He states that an American Bar Associa-
tion Committee is considering the "possibility of post-law-school in-
ternship." 11
In other words, the idea is this: Have law students spend three long
years being mis-educated--i.e., receiving incorrect impressions of how
courts and lawyers conduct themselves-and then have the students
spend another post-graduate year unlearning those false impressions.
Langdell's ghost still controls these professors. I should like to see some-
one make an anthropological study of law schools, with a full account
of their institutional inertia.
The law schools do a pretty good job of training men to be upper-
court judges. My law clerks could soon creditably serve on an appel-
late bench. But American law schools do nothing specifically to edu-
45. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong With So-Called Legal Education, 35 COL. L. RM.
651, 675-6 (1935).
46. Incidentally, the differences between Llewellyn and me as to legal education serve
to illustrate the lack of homogeneity among the so-called "legal realists."
47. Simpson and Field, Social Engineering Through Law: The Need For a School
of Applied Jurisprudence, 22 N-Y.U. L. Q. REv. 145, 184 (1947).
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cate men to become trial judges, although the job of such a judge is
far more demanding than that of an upper-court wearer of the ermine.
I suggest that such training should include some work with a psychia-
trist, so that a student, who is a potential trial judge, would learn to
know something of his own concealed prejudices and how to control
them. 48 Such a student should, even while in school, act as an appren-
tice to a trial judge. Many trial judges would be pleased to lend such
educational assistance. I hasten to add that I intend no denigration
of trial judges; many of them are conscientious men of the highest
order of ability. But the duties of such judges require unusual apti-
tudes; and our present trial methods, for which the trial judges cannot
be held responsible, are amazingly antiquated.
LAW OFFICES AS LABORATORIES
I have said that litigation is the lawyer's ultimate reference, his ex-
cuse for differentiating himself from other men, the core of his special-
ity. But, although no lawyer should be unversed in the way courts
function, it is true that many lawyers never get into court. They ad-
vise clients, draft their contracts and wills, attend corporate directors'
meetings, help to negotiate business transactions, settle disputes with-
out recourse to litigation, engage in arbitrations. Successful lawyers
thus engaged have learned much about human nature. They are work-
ing psychologists, working anthropologists. They know that, while
the ultimate "sanction" of a "legal right" may be a court decision,
there are other sanctions some of which at times are more powerful
than court orders; I refer to such social compulsives as the customs of
a trade, or the beliefs and attitudes of particular sub-groups in the
community. Most university law schools do not even hint at the skills
such lawyer-activities demand. For instance, some of Columbia's grad-
uates, honor men in their day at school, and now, experts in such skills,
successfully practising in New York City, have told me they would be
delighted to talk about their experiences to Columbia law students.
Yet Columbia never thinks of inviting them to do so. Such talks would
have some slight educational value. But the only way for students really
to learn those skills would be to see them in operation and to participate
in those operations. Near at hand to every law school are those lawyer-
laboratories known as law offices, where students could learn the rela-
tion of their theoretical studies to the realities of a practicing lawyer's
life. A few university law school teachers take their students to look
inside those laboratories. Such visits are indeed desirable. But they
are pale substitutes for the real thing. The real thing would be to have
such laboratories inside the law school. I do not mean the so-called
48. See Frank, Scientific Spirit and Economic Doginatimn, in SciENCE Fel DNOMa C.
11 (1946) ; FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 147 (1931).
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"Practice Laboratory," now in vogue in some schools, where students
draft documents for supposititious or paper clients. I mean, as I've
said, law schools which are themselves, in part, law offices dealing with
flesh-and-blood clients.
Here I must warn against a dangerously fallacious notion advanced
by many professors, and too, alas, by some practicing non-court law-
yers. They say that skill in draftsmanship vastly reduces litigation,
since a client with a well-prepared document is so very likely to win a
lawsuit, should one occur, that it seldom occurs. This unverified thesis
rests on the assumption that carefully prepared documents successfully
prevent the raising of disputed issues of fact in lawsuits. An exper-
ienced trial lawyer smiles at that naive assumption. It derives from
a fatuous faith in the parol evidence rule. But that is the leakiest of
rules. 41 It permits of dozens of exceptions, any one of which lets in
an issue of fact, and thence of credibility for a jury, thereby putting
the document at the mercy of a jury's guess.
WORDS To BE SHUNNED-HEREIN OF '"LEGAL SCIENCE" AND
"SOCIAL SCIENCES"
In the kind of school I envision, three words would be used with great
caution. The first is "law." It oozes ambiguity. If you want to waste
time, contrive a definition of it. You'll discover-I have--that dozens
of other men, each with his own pet definition, will hotly attack you,
and that the ensuing debate will be unbelievably futile. The best plan
is never, when possible, to use the word; the second best, is to give your
own definition each time you use it. 11
Another word which should be taboo is "science" when applied to
matters legal (as in the phrases "legal science" or "the science of law")
or to social studies (as in the phrase "the social sciences"). To be sure,
"'science" can be so defined as to bring within its scope what is done by
many lawyers and legal scholars, and also by students of government,
economics, history, psychology and anthropology; so, for instance, one
can say, if one wishes, that "science" means "the persistent and skilled
use of the mind" or "knowledge that accrues when methods are em-
ployed which deal competently with problems." To most persons to-
day, however, "science" signifies a large measure of exactitude, and
methods which yield much reliable prediction; the word evokes, for
most men (many lawyers among them), a central image of something
like physics, so that, to them, "science," the "physical sciences," and
"exact science," are all but synonomous. But social studies, including
49. See the brilliant article by Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L. J. 603
(1944); cf. Frank, Scientific Spirit and Ecomomic Dogmatism, in SCIENCE FOR DEMOC-
RACY 11 (1946) ; FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 147 (1931).
50. FRANK, IF MEN WEa ANGELS 279-80 (1942); Frank, Arc fudgcs Hinu', 80
U. OF PA. L. REv. 17, 45 (1931).
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studies of matters legal, deal with data which permit little exactitude
and thus yield only a dismayingly small quantity of reliable predictions.
Of scientific "laws," similar to the "laws" developed by the physicist, 51
there are virtually none in economics, politics or sociology. Har, in his
book, Social Laws, examined 168 alleged "social laws." He found at
most a few generalizations possessed of a reasonable degree of probabil-
ity-"Gresham's Law" and the Malthusian population conjectures,
for instance. Even these few generalizations, Har believes, should be
called "statements of tendencies" rather than "scientific laws." For
they must be accompanied by such phrases as, "other things being
equal," "it tends to," "by and large," "on the whole," or "in the long
run." "What," asks Har, "do these phrases mean? Let us take, for
example, 'the long run.' The 'long run' cannot be a short run; the 'long
run' cannot be eternity, for eternity can only be thought of, but not
lived through. The 'long run' is not a period of time which can be
marked off with any precision." For otherwise "we would not find it
necessary to take refuge in such a vague phrase. . . There remains
only one possible meaning which might render the expression sensible;
namely, that the 'long run' is such a length of time as is just sufficient
to fulfill the conditions implied in the expression. Any social law which
contains the phrase . . . in this sense may be a circular statement.
The same may be said of the other phrases such as 'on the whole'...;
and a law of this type . . . is always, 'other things being equal,' char-
acteristically too vague to be much of a. law; and if it be made a little
more explicit, it frequently turns out to be a circular statement . .. ;
other things are rarely equal, and the various tendencies continually
counteract one another." 52
The trouble is that basically all the so-called "social sciences" are
but phases of anthropology. 1 For they consist of attempted generali-
zations relating to the customs, social beliefs and group beliefs (the
mores, the follcvays), 54 matterswhich, especially in a changing modem
society, are not readily predictable, because of the numerous elusive
and accidental factors, including the fortuitous effectsof forceful ("earth-
51. As to the constant interaction of such "laws" and "facts," see FnAm, FA&m AD
FREamom c. 14 (1945).
52. Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. oF P.,. L. REv. 233, 255 (1931); see also
FRANK, FATE AND FEEDO.m 33-6 (1945).
53. See Frank, Experimental Science and The New Deal, 78 Co-.o. RE. 12412
(1933).
54. "Too few economists perceive that fact. As a consequence, two thirds or more of
the 'laws' of conventional economics represent generalizations, drawn from descriptions,
often not too accurate, of some selected customary conduct, beliefs, and attitudes of a
given social group within a limited period, the selected data having what the economists
call an 'economic' character' Frank, Sctiiific Spirit and Economic Dogmatisn, in Sc-
ENcE FoR DEmocRAcy 11, 13 (1946) ; see also FRnNK, SAvE A,.mrnc& Fmsr 8-9 (1933).
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quake") personalities. 11 There can be, I think, no exact "science of
custom." As I have suggested, 11 "The art of government, at bottom,
is a branch of anthropology. . . .The statesman thus appears as a
working anthropologist. If a sagacious statesman, he is a careful stu-
dent of customs. . . .The political economist who wants to serve the
statesman must understand that his work is .. .anthropological,
that he must become an inventor of new acceptable customs. . . The
spirit of science emplo3ied in our national affairs today means the maxi-
mum of attainable wisdom in the examination of our traditions to deter-
mine which of them should be modified to meet present critical needs
and to foster our values-and, at the same time, to understand which
of them are so central, so precious to the majority in our society, that
to impair them will invite disaster." 11
True, as the better educated 20th century man knows, the physical
sciences now show up as far less exact than they seemed to all but a few
thinkers during the preceding three centuries. 's Nor can it be gainsaid
that the practitioners of those sciences successfully utilize "ideal" con-
cepts (e. g., "frictionless engines") which involve notions such as "other
things being equal." It might therefore be suggested that the difference
between physics, on the one hand, and the "social sciences" (including
"law") on the other, is merely one of degree. That is a tricky sugges-
tion, because of the width of the degree. It is said that the difference
between a difference of kind and a difference of degree is not itself a
difference of kind but one of degree-a "violent" one, however. 11 The
difference here under discussion is peculiarly "violent."
The talk of "social sciences" began with men who thought a "social
physics" could be created, and that dream still persists. Talk of "legal
science" has its peculiar dangers, since, for a long period, the belief in a
mathematically-based "science of law" was widespread among learned
lawyers, 10 and that belief has recurrently revived in divers forms. The
labels "social sciences" and "legal science" therefore arouse hopes which
have never been realized and which, inherently, cannot be realized.
55. See FRANK, FATE AND FREDOt 44 (1945).
56. Frank, Scientific Spirit and Economic Dogmatism, in SCIENcE rOR DEMocRACY1 11,
12-3 (1946).
57. For development of this theme, see FRANK, SAvE AMERICA FIRST, Preface, cc. 2-4
and 19 (1938).
58. I must here content myself with the above brief reference to changed attitudes
toward physics. But, since one law teacher who heard me read this paper chided me for
ignorantly adhering to an outmoded notion of the physical sciences, I here cite, by way
of reply to that criticism, FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 145-87, 298-308, 309-37, (cf. 38-41,
87-105, 115-42, 216-7, 275-6) (1945) ; FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MiNiD, app. III
(1930).
59. See Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q.REv. 179, 192 (1945).
60. DICKINsON, ADMIISsTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 114-5 (1927).
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 94-7 (1930).
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To avoid illusions and disappointments, we should speak, modestly,
of the "social studies" or "social arts." Above all, lawyers should be
on their guard against thinking of themselves as engaged in an exact
science, since theirs is, in large part, the study of the often unpredict-
able ways of trial judges and juries. 11 I agree with the Lasswell-Mc-
Dougal intimation 12 that the concept of a "science of legal prediction,"
envisioning techniques for predicting most specific decisions, ought to
be laughed out of existence. 11
For related reasons, I think that lawyers and law students should
not use the phrase "legal engineering." An engineer can't build a bridge
without the help of physics. Engineering is thus an applied science and
thus relies on the so-called exact sciences. As there does not now exist-
and almost surely will never exist-a legal science, or any other social
science, comparable to physics, nothing but confusion can be engen-
dered by the phrase "legal engineering."
THE SCIENTiIc SPIRIT
I do not mean that judges should not avail themselves of the fruits
of physical science. Nor do I mean that they and lawyers should not
cultivate the "scientific spirit." For the scientific spirit of the physi-
cist can be differentiated from his products and his mathematical meth-
ods, from his use of scientific "laws" which, it is said, express "ab-
stract universals dealing with repeatable elements." 4 That spirit, at
61. Compare Keyser, On the Study of Legal Science, 33 YAtI L. J. 413 (1929).
62. Lasswell and McDougal, supra note 34, at 237.
63. Not that the techniques of trial lawyers and trial courts have been without value
in the development of scientific method. "Bacon's logic of invention or discovery,"
writes McKeon, "which has been returned to good repute in the pragmatic logic of the
twentieth century, was criticized in the nineteenth century for applying improper and
inoperable legal methods to scientific problems in an effort to supply a method of inven-
tion from the techniques of law. The relation is well grounded, for Bacon's inductive
logic is based on his special places or topics which he relates to and differentiates from
the common-places of rhetoric. The complexity of the historical derivations of the logic
of discovery may therefore be seen in Bacon's use of instruments derived from forensic
oratory in his revolt against scholastic logic, which he represented as purely verbal and
syllogistic, whereas the scholastic logicians in turn had learned from Boethius to repeat
Cicero's distinction of logic into two parts, invention and judgment, and to find the great
virtue of Aristotle in his discovery and development of the logic of invention. The logic
of discovery or invention, both in the Middle Ages and in the revolt of the Renaissance,
-derived not only its terminology and the orientation of its method but its application of
utility as a criterion to science from the influence of Cicero's legal and rhetorical method.
The Roman's philosophy in turn is a more simple practical adaptation of Aristotle's
rhetoric and Socrates' cross-questioning elenchus, both of which have obvious deriva-
tions from legal procedure." McKeon, Democracy, Scientific Method, and Action, 55
ETH Ics 235, 252 (1945).
64. See FaAmx, FATE AND FRmoDOm 40-1 (1945) ; FRANH, LAW .mD TM 0D=
MIND 93 et seq., 285 et seq. (1930) ; Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. oF PA. L. Ruv.
232, 257 (1931).
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its best, entails, we are told, the discipline of suspended judgment,
distrust of dogmas, a serene passion for verification. Lawyers imbued
with such a spirit deny that they are or ever will be scientists-not be-
cause lawyers are inferior mentally to physicists, but because they deal
with matters far more complex than physics. 11
ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES OF THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL RULES
The scientific spirit among lawyers will foster the notion that exist-
ing or proposed legal rules should be evaluated respectively in terms
of their actual or potential social consequences. Unfortunately, the
courts, although sententiously they talk much of those consequences,
possess no adequate means of ascertaining them. 6 Nor, unfortunately,
has anyone else much of such knowledge. I therefore heartily favor
the kind of research once conducted at Johns Hopkins Law School and
which the University of Chicago Law School, I think, is about to under-
take-research in the social effects of legal rules. 11 Such anthropologi-
cal studies-which should cover the reciprocal interaction of legal rules
and social habits-deserve the highest approbation and encourage-
ment. 68 But such efforts will be dangerously misleading if they ignore
the impact of trial-court fact-finding on the operation of the rules in the
courts.
Moreover, thosie who undertake such studies should acknowledge,
to themselves and others, that those studies are affected by subjectivity
to a far greater extent than the physical sciences. 69 Social statistics,
which, to the unsophisticated, may seem indubitably certain and "ob-
jective," usually rest on someone's selection of "data," and the selec-
tor's choice is seldom indisputably correct. Chance, we are told, fre-
quently determines the statistical results. The investigator may "be
compelled to employ data . ..because of their availability"; or "his
65. "We must not look for the same degree of accuracy in all subjects; we must be
content in each class of subjects with accuracy of such a kind as the subject matter
allows, and to such extent as is proper to the inquiry .... An educated person will ex-
pect accuracy in each subject only so far as the nature of the subject allows". ARisTOTlI,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. 1, c. VII, Bk. 1, c. II. See McKeon, Aristotle's Conceptiot
of the Development and Nature of Scientific Method, 8 J. OF HISTORY OF IDEAs 3 (1947),
66. See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 769-70 (C.C.A. 2d 1946). For tie
danger in a democracy of applying the natural science analogy too strictly when dealing with
social problems, see MvicKeon, Democracy, Scientific Method and Action, 55 ETICS 235,
270-86 (1945).
67. For bibliography and discussion see CAIRNS, LEGAL SCIENCE 6-7 (1941).
68. Such anthropological studies should include an inquiry into the factors which
prevent litigation, in general and in particular social groups. Cf. FRANK, IF MEN Wi
ANGELS 102-4 (1942).
69. That even in the "exact" sciences there is more of subjectivity than many "exact"
scientists will admit, see FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM c. 14 (1945) ; cf. id. at 76-7, 312-5.
See also FRANK, THE PLACE OF THE EXPERT IN A DEMOCRATIC SociTY (1944) ; Zell v.
American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 646 n. 20b (C.C.A. 2d 1943).
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preconceptions" concerning the subject may lead "him to believe that
certain significant relationships existed," and, without sufficient veri-
fication, he may smuggle those preconceptions into his selections of
"data" and his conclusions. "In either event, the results of the research
are not conclusive with respect to other, unperceived and possibly more
important relationships"; the results may be "largely dependent upon
the chance sampling of many factors." The "sampling" may not be
"representative," the data may have mere "pseudo-objectivity." TO
As one writer sagaciously comments: "Our power of measurement of
social tendencies is limited to their external and visible manifestations;
and this limitation restricts the scope of the questions that a social stat-
istician may be expected to answer. In social phenomena, the 'effects'
of several 'causes' operating together may be very different from the
sum of their effects"; there may be "disturbing factors whose effects
cannot be eliminated by experimental or statistical techniques." 71 An
experienced social investigator, who deservedly enjoys high esteem,
says that one who plots a curve of a "trend" should "not fail to admit
that the determination of the 'best' trend is largely subjective." Writ-
ing of one of her own elaborate studies, she states that most of her
charts "could have been given many different interpretations by many
different readers," adding, "[Ijt is difficult to tell by reading the result
of another's investigations just what assumptions he made; just how
his interpretation can be made in the light of the particular application
of statistical method to particular data; just how often convenience
has dictated procedure." 72
"TREND THINxING" AND THINKFUL WISHING
I keep these cautions in mind when I read the valuable article on
legal education by Lasswell and McDougal. They urge the need of
"trend thinking." The "task is to think creatively," they say, "about
how to alter, deter, or accelerate probable trends in order to shape the
future closer to our ideals. . . .A trend is not a course of change" but
a "register of the relative strength" of the several factors that produce
it. "When we look toward the future our aim should not be to draw a
fatalistic series of trend curves in the direction they have been moving
in the past." To draw such curves, to see what the uncontrolled future
might be, is wise, but (they continue) only as "a prelude to the use of
creative imagination .. . in deciding how to influence the future."
For the "very acts of taking thought and. of acting on the basis of
70. Rice, Behaviour Alternatives as Statistical Data in METHODS 1-1 SOCIAL SCE, CZ
586, 595, 597, 598, 607 (1931).
71. Kemp, Mathematical Treatment of Social Data in MErnons w SOCIAL SCIEMCa
566, 571, 574-5 (1931).
72. Id. at 575, 578, 580.
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thought are among the factors that determine the future trend of
events." 7 That is splendid counsel. Yet, recalling the remarks, quoted
above, of trained social investigators, we ought to be somewhat more
modest than these sage thinkers, Lasswell and McDougal, sometimes
appear to be, about believing that anyone can know what all the trends
are, that anyone can accurately foretell what the uncontrolled future
would be, that the injection of thought-created purposive plans will
have a nicely foreseeable "influence on the future" and nicely pre-
dictable consequences. 74
Man cannot help planning; not to plan is, but one kind of planning,
But efforts to control the future should be made with the utmost of
tentativeness, with a weather eye constantly open for signs that factors
have been overlooked and for indications of new, unexpected, emerging
factors which warn that revisions of our plans are desirable. The more
modest we are about our ability to discern tendencies, and the more
"scientific" we are in admitting that we cannot know them with much
exactitude, the better use we can make of those tendencies we do ob-
serve. Over-confidence in what we know is the twin sister of ignorance.
I am not espousing anti-rationality, but expressing a healthy respect
for the non-rational and chance factors in social behavior and in human
experience generally. The hardiest foe of the increased effective use of
reason is false rationalism-the fatuous belief that reason already plays
a larger part in human affairs than it does in fact, and the concomitant
delusion that man's finite reason can ever comprehend all that occurs
in the universe. "The point is," I have said elsewhere, "that the ra-
tional and ethical factors are thwarted . ..by the tendency to ignore
the non-rational and non-ethical" factors. 11 "There is no greater
obstacle to the development of rationality than the illusion that one is
rational when one is the dupe of illusions." 11 Only "by recognition of
the immense stretches of unreasons" can "its proportions .. .be
reduced." 11
73. Lasswell and McDougal, mipra note 34.
74. As to the effects of accidents, see, e.g., FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM c. 4 (1945);
see id. c. 5 as to the way in which plans have often miscarried, with consequences which the
planners did not foresee and which they would have loathed. The anthropological view
points up a troublesome fact: "A culture is a congeries of discrete -elements having,
often, no necessary or rational connection .. In a given culture, a custom may have
grown up in such a way that it becomes associated with anothed custom . . .The as-
sociated customs may . . . fundamentally contradict one another . . . 'Man's brain,'
said De Gourmont, 'is a museum of contradictory truths . . .There are no ideas so re-
mote, no images so ill assorted, that an easy habit of association may not bring them
together.'" FRANK, SAVE AmERicA FIRST 17 (1938). See also Frank, Book Review,
57 HARv. L. REv. 1120, 1121 (1944).
75. Frank, Book Review, 40 YALE L. J. 1120 n. 1 (1931).
76. Frank, Are Judges Hunwn?, 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 233 (1931).
77. Frank, Experimental Jurisprudehice and the New Deal, 78 CoNG. REc. 12412
(1934).
[Vol. 56. 13031336
HeinOnline  -- 56 Yale L.J. 1336 1946-1947
A PLEA FOR LAWYER-SCHOOLS
The books are strewn with social predictions that went wrong. Burke
scored a happy guess in 1790 when he prophesied that the laxrelations
of the French government with the Fxench army would lead to the
rise of a "popular general" who would become a dictator. But many
wise men have made erroneous forecasts. Palrerston and Disraeli
thought Germany would be defeated in the Franco-Prussian war of
1870; Morley believed Australia would never fight to aid Belgium.
Many predictions of Marx and Engels misfired. 8 Particularly in our
dynamic society are long-range social predictions difficult, because to-
day the time-span of continuity is shorter. New medicines can poke
holes in the life-tables. Consider the accidental and unforeseeable
origin of several major scientific discoveries which have revolutionized
our society. 71 (A banker once defined an invention as something which
ruined his investments.) Even short-range forecasts are not tco easy:
recently many of our ablest economists went far wide of the mark in
their prophecies of unemployment in 1946-47.
It would be interesting to have Lasswell and McDougal publish some
of their own social predictions, with special reference to the conduct of
the courts. If their program is to succeed, it must I think have as its
foundation the kind of work to which Underhill More has for years de-
voted himself. In an exquisitely cautious manner, he has tried to dis-
cover and accurately describe the interplay of social and strictly legal
phenomena. I more than suspect that he is willing to confess that, except
as to very simple social happenings, his efforts have largely (yet valu-
ably) proved a negative; and I would add (as probably he would) that,
even as to those simple happenings, the vagaries of trial-court fact-find-
Repugnance to recognition of- the immense stretches of unreason accounts for some
of the criticism of some of the "realists.' Thus Bodenheimer takes them to task for
paying too much attention to the trial courts. The result will be, he says, to expose the
irrational elements (the existence of which he grudgingly admits) in the judicial process,
thereby shaking confidence in the rationality of "law." He adds thmt "realist jurispru-
dence" exhibits a distrust in the powers of human reason. BODENsmEn, JunlscntuDP c
310, 315 (1940). Akin is the attitude of those who decry efforts to acquaint the public
with the deficiencies of court-house government. That attitude I think thoroughly un-
democratic. See FRANx, IF MEN WE=n ANGELS 107-8 (1942). With the pessimistic
conclusions and the analyses of such writers as Pareto, Burnham and Hans Morgenthau,
I basically disagree. But anyone who pretends to a "scientific" attitude tovards social
problems cannot afford to forego reading what such writers say of the impediments to
rational thinking about such problems. See PARETO, THE MIND AND SoCIL'y (1935) ; Bun,-
HAIS, TE M1ACHIAVELLIAvS (1943) ; MoROmNTHAU, ScmNTIFC MANI vs. PoVER Po.-
TIcs (1946). For a provocative discussion of the rationality of nonlogical (non-verbal)
symbolism, see LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEEW KEY (1942).
78. See, e.g., FRANK, FATE AND FREEDom 73-5 (1945) ; ScHwAnZscIILD, THE RED
PRUssiAN 400-1 (1947).
. 79. See, e.g., FRAx, FA i AND FREEnom 50-1, 182-4 (1945) ; CAN.ozi, Tim VAY
OF AN INVESTIGATOR c. VI (1945) ; cf. Frank, Accounting For Investors, 53 JouMu. op
AccouxTANcY 295 (1939).
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ing render highly dubious most prophecies concerning specific court
decisions.
Beware of the notion of averages in predicting such specific decisions. 80
For any such average which makes sense must be based on knowledge,
by the person who contrived the average, of the actual past facts of each
case considered. Averages, yielding some reliable predictions of the legal
rules which the courts will use, can be compiled. 81 But such predictions
will not help one to pre-know what "facts" will be "found" in specific
cases; and without such' pre-knowledge the outcome of particular law
suits cannot be foretold. 82
Nevertheless, we must not cease trying to discover-even if often the
results w ill necessarily be crude--the effects of existing or proposed legal
rules (statutory or judge-made) on social conduct, and also the effect of
that conduct on such rules. Guess we frequently must, but our guesses
should be educated guesses. We should use the scientific approach to our
ideals, and, so far as possible, the scientific method. As I have said else-
where, "An ideal represents an aspiration, a wish. The scientific-minded
idealist does not indulge in wishful thinking, but he does indeed engage
in what Neurath calls thinkful wishing. Instead of using an ideal as a
daydream, such an idealist regards it as a wish postulate. He tries to
ascertain what changes can and must be brought about in orderto make
his wish come true. He may discover that no feasible means exist to reach
that end, or that it can onlybe partially reached. He may find the adoption
of the necessary means would entail such devastating social consequences
that his ideal should be abandoned. As Aristotle put it: 'In framing an
ideal we may assume what we wish, but we should avoid impossibilities.'
'Political writers,' he commented, 'although they have excellent ideas, are
often impractical.' The statesman-like economist .. .inventively ...
suggests possible innovations to meet current needs," but "imbued with
the scientific spirit .. .does so without dogmatism. He knows that
his desires may color his theories and that his theories, if he is incautious,
will excessively govern his selection of facts. He does his best to counter-
act such subtle influences. He seeks imaginatively to envision the way
in which his .. . social inventions will operate; for his is the experi-
mental method, applied, as far as it can be, to social facts. His method
is scientific in that he looks for available means to attain desired ends." 11
80. As to the difference between the use of averages in physics and in social studies,
see FRANKc, FATE AND FREEDOM 43-5, 150-7, 33-4 (1945).
81. Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 233 (1931).
82. Averages here are, therefore, far less trustworthy than many employed in social
studies.
83. Frank, Scientific Spirit anzd Economic Dogmatism, in ScmlxcE For DEMOCRAcy
11, 13, 17 (1946). See also FRAx, IF MEN Wnas ANGELS 119, 364-5 (1942) ; Frank,
Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thziking, 17 CORN. L. Q. 568, 584-5
(1932) ; FRANx, FATE AND F EEom 216-7 (cf. 139) (1945).
I agree with Kallen that those persons err who "deny that values and facts are com-
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HeinOnline  -- 56 Yale L.J. 1338 1946-1947
A PLEA FOR LAWYER-SCHOOLS
Here, then, as in respect to all man's efforts to guess the future, we
should avoid the sin of perfectionism, which mutilates life by demanding
the impossible. 84 No truly intelligent person rejects the possibility of
reducing uncertainty because it cannot be completely obliterated-just
as no sane man wxill turn his back on physicians merely because the flesh
is heir to many diseases for which cures have not been and may never be
discovered.
Opposition to labelling as "sciences" legal and other social studies does
not signify a belief that the "scientific spirit" is hostile to ideals and
ethics. On the contrary, the lack of true scientific spirit among many of
those men called "economists" induced them to picture "economics
as a science, a notion which worked much harm ethically. Bent on
achieving what they falsely considered scientific dispassionateness,
disinterestedness and objectivity, they have long been striving to
cut themselves off from ethics and politics. In producing 'economics,'
they gelded 'political economy'; and gelding, as usual, caused ste-
rility. . . . Scientific method . . . entails awareness of the 'personal
equation' so that due allowance can be made for it. Most economists
have not borrowed that wisdom from the natural scientists. 85 By
pretending to themselves and to others that their alleged science
rests on a complete indifference to ethical values and ideals, many
economists have concealed the ever-present activity, in their think-
ing and observations, of their owm social ideals. Their suppressed
ethical attitudes and assumptions thereby become the more pronounced
in their effects. Asserting that they were dispassionate, the economists
become peculiarly passionate." ,
mensurable or that the method of science has any import for the existence of values." I alo
in the main agree with him that the "method of science... is the form that debate
receives when it treats alternative claims as equal and gives each the fullest opportunity
to make itself good in consequences."; and that "a fact is made a value when some
one clings to and cherishes it in spite of consequences, when he declines to risk it on
equal terms against the competition of alternatives according to the methods and tests
of scientific discourse, while per contra, a value is made a fact when its validity is freely
submitted to these validations.' Kallen, Modernity and Liberty, 18 U. oF BUFFALo STuDiEs
73, 104 (1947). See also Ho6k, Abstractions in Social Inquiry, 34 ILL. L. RE%. 13, 18
(1939).
However, in considering the views of such Deweyites as Kallen and Hool it is vll
to heed the observations of McKeon. See McKeon, Democracy, Scicntific Methods, a:d
Action, 55 ETHIcS 235 (1945); McKeon, Discussion and Resolution in Political Con-
flicts, 54 ETHics 235 (1944) ; McKeon, Economic, Political, and Moral Communities in
the World Society, 57 ETmICs 79 (1947).
84. As to "positive" and "negative!' perfectionists, see FMZ¢v IF MEZ; WE= A-.-
GELS 136-9 (1942).
85. To be sure, even some of the greatest natural scientists have, at times, been
shockingly personal and prejudiced, with adverse effects on their scientific work. See
FRANY, FATE AND FREEIo 180-1 (1945). Cf. CAzxo-, TnE VAys oF A-. Iuvsrx-
GATOR 98-9, 126-7 (1945).
86. Frank, The Scientific Spirit and Economic Doginatism, op. cit. supra note 83, at
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CONSTRUCTIVE SIEPTICISM AND PLANNING
Years ago, I suggested that, for the misdescriptive label "legal real-
ism," there be substituted "constructive skepticism." It is that attitude
I would, if I could, irlculcate in law students. Roughly speaking, it
fuses these two elements: (1) an eagerness to contrive, or to make oper-
able, social inventions which will improve the workings of our demo-
cratic society; (2) an unceasing awareness of the difficulties of that
undertaking (because of its complexity and inescapably guessy quali-
ties) and of the consequent need ever to be tentative, experimental, in
the formulation of ways and means. Accordingly, I dissent when Mc-
Dougal seems to say that "realism" represents a "destructive" phase
of legal scholarship which must now be superseded by another phase
which will "center its energies upon conscious efforts to create the in-
stitutions, doctrines and practices of the future," and give prime em-
phasis to policy. 87 For constructive skepticism is not at odds with but
essential to such policy making. To be personal for a moment, I think
that my own modest "policy" activities (however incompetent) during
some eight years of governmental service in Washington, and my writ-
ings concerning government and "economics," are evidence of an in-
tense interest in the construction of solutions to one of the two problems
McDougal considers of "overwhelming urgency": how to "preserve
our domestic strength and prevent economic depressions." 8s And my
experience in government taught me that, without skepticism, only
pessimism and cynicism can come from efforts to "clarify community
values and ... the conditions of their achievement." 9 McDougal seems
to present to the law schools as mutually exclusive alternatives (or as
successive phases, the first of which he says is passe) what I think are
12, 19. As to the evil effects of the "religion of science" on social thinking see FRANK,
FATE AND FaxDom passim (1945), and especially c. 11.
87. McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Sd-
enwe in the World Community, 56 YALE L. J. 1345, 1349 (1947).
.8., Id. at 1348.
89. Id. at 1346. McDougal asserts that the "chief cbntribution" of "legal realism"
was "to establish the fact that the doctrines, the verbal propositions, commonly called
law are meaningful only when located in the total context in which they are being used-
in the community process in which people are using these doctrines to effect, or justify,
some specific distribution of values." He refers, in.this connection to "cynics" who
"deride language as meaningless." Doubtless the so-called "realists" did promote the
study of legal semantics. But, unless one incorrectly takes the "realists" as a homogenous
group, this was not their "chief contribution." In their writings and governmental activi-
ties, some of them, as indicated in the text, tried also to "clarify community values and
to identify the conditions of their achievement"-so far as that task was feasible. Nor
is it true that all the "realists" derided language as meaningless. See, e.g., FRANX, IF
MEN WERE ANGELS 312-4 (1942); Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. OF PA. L, Rav.
232, 264-5 (1931).
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complementaries. (Perhaps I have misunderstood McDougal." I sin-
cerely hope so, for I consider his educational program, properly quali-
fied, profoundly right.)
The old anarchistic regime of ultra-let-alone-ism can no longer serve
our needs. Increased social cooperativeness, both domestically and on
a planetary scale, has become imperative. Plan, then, we must. "I As
to our domestic future, our traditions and values put us in a position
where we have to choose either (1) chaos, or (2) civil war, or (3) some
sort of democratic planning inside a profit system, planning which seeks
a working compromise. 92 Government "must be efficient... without
being despotic . . , it must ensure individual political freedoms with-
out crumbling into anarchy." 13 Our planning should, then, be exceed-
ingly flexible and circumspect. 94 When someone says, "We know how
to clarify values into blueprints for action," 5 we should answer, "Yes,
we know a little about it." 11 Since act we must, our attitude ought
to be, as Kallen says, that "The important thing is to have faith but not
illusions and to risk action on this faith." 01
As I've written elsewhere, if we are not "cocksure about what we
know and can know, we can be more sure that our choices will be real,
not illusions. Thereby .. . we shall become both more humble and
90. His earlier article, Fuller 'vs. the American Legal Realsts, 50 YAs= L. J. 827
(1941), encourages that hope.
91. Even Hayek favors "good" planning, THE ROAD TO SERnou, passim (1944).
92. See FRAxx, SAVE AmERICA FisT, passim (193S). Despair (engendered by the
aftermath of World War I) of the possibility of coping with political-economic problems
elsewhere in the world, induced me in that book to urge that Americans concentrate on
western-hemispheric planning. Until the fall of France in World War II, I failed to
see that the industrial technology which seemed to make that program feasible had an
evil twin, military technology, which rendered that program hopeless. I so confessed in
several writings published before Pearl Harbor.
93. FRA-Kr, IF MEN WERE AxGELs 18-9, 164-78 (1942).
"Sage political thinkers have always considered as the chie problem of government
the reconciliation of the conflicting demands of liberty and authority. They have sought to
find an escape from the twin evils of anarchy and tyranny. No perfect escape can be found.
But, as Jefferson and Lincoln recognized, democracy offers the best way out. It can,
of course, fully satisfy neither of the opposing yearnings of man, since, in its very nature,
democracy represents a compromise between the two. But a democracy dlone affords
an opportunity to achieve a working balance." FRANK, FATE AND FR-nico 204-5 (1945).
(1945).
94. For an excellent example, see Keyserling, Must We Have Another Depression,
N. Y. Times, June 8, 1947.
95. McDougal, supra note 87, at 1349.
96. Strangely enough, considering McDougal's criticism, McKeon writes that the
"realists" have "argued that the treatment of human actions and institutions will become
'scientific' only when the facts of action and association are formulated in laws com-
parable to those discovered in mathematics and the physical sciences.' McKeon, Eco-
,wnmic, Political and Moral Comunities in the World Society, 57 ETHICS 79, 83 (1947).
McKeon's criticism is misdirected so far as some of the "realists" are concerned.
97. Kallen, supra note 83, 129.
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more effective.... We shall be wise only if we recognize the inherent
imperfections and instability of our solutions. The major obstacles
to human progress center in the beliefs that our progress is destined
and that men, necessarily limited in knowledge, can attain perfection.
The only absolute knowledge on which we can count is the knowledge
that human knowledge will never be absolute, will always be relative
and limited. That awareness, however, while it will eliminate much
blundering, will not enable us to elude our limitations. Thus we come
to the basic paradox of the American faith: humility in the face of our
limitations but faith that our will can move us forward on the road to
the good life. The impossibility of arriving at perfection does not justify
indifference to the aim of constantly bettering man's lot." s
BREAD-AND-BUTTER SCHOOLS
In almost every large city, there is at least one bread-and-butter
"local" law school, attended by students who lack the financial means
to attend a university school. Most of the students, in addition to going
to school, work in law offices. The university schools look down their
noses at these "local" schools, despite the fact that some of our ablest,
most successful, and most nationally public-spirited lawyers-Randolph
Paul and Morris Ernst, for instance-were graduated from such insti-
tutions.
Some persons believe it may be easier to produce a satisfactory, well-
rounded, legal education by supplementing the curriculums of the
"local" schools than by revising the studies at the university schools,
remote as the latter are from lawyerdom. The former, it is argued, are
already closer to the essentials of a sound legal education: Many of their
teachers are, or once were, in active practice; they therefore have no
fear of the realities. Most of the students, in their out-of-school hours,
perforce have daily direct contacts with the lawyer-laboratories. I ear-
nestly suggest that the legal profession consider carefully whether those
schools could not be transformed into admirable apprentice schools.
If such a school were to call in as teachers some of its prominent alumni
and were to supplement its present courses with some first-rate courses
in psychology, history, political science, economics, ethics and anthro-
pology, it might well be a path-maker to a good legal education.
EXCEPTIONS
To avoid misunderstanding, I want to say, emphatically, that all
university law schools and all their teachers do not deserve my stric-
tures. I believe that, as a whole, Yale Law School, for example, comes
closer to grips with lawyers' realities than Harvard. 11 And Harvard,
98. FRANx, FATE AND FREEDom 336-7 (1945).
99. Yale's tolerance is evidenced by the fact that I am permitted to teach there, and
in my teaching, to state the view expressed in this paper.
[Vol, 56: 13031342
HeinOnline  -- 56 Yale L.J. 1342 1946-1947
A PLEA FOR LAWYER-SCHOOLS
as Columbia and many another school, has professors who are outstand-
ing exceptions to my description of the genus law teacher.
One such exception is Morgan of Harvard who, in 1936, said in re-
viewing Goldstein's book on Trial Technigues:
"If only some lawyer could rise up and honestly denounce Mr.
Goldstein as a defamer of his profession .... If only a reviewer
could assert that this book is a guide not to the palaces of virtue
but to the red-light districts of the law. But a decent respect for
the truth compels the admission that Mr. Goldstein has told his
story truly. He has told it calmly, without a pretence of shame and
(God save us!) without the slightest suspicion of its shamefulness.
He has shown by his own unperturbed frankness with what com-
plaisance the profession, which would smile the superior smile of
derision at the suggestion of a trial by battle of bodies, accepts
trial by battle of wits. In all innocence, he has produced a volume
which is a devastating commentary upon an important aspect of
our administration of justice." 10
Teachers with Morgan's courage and insight strive to preserve law
students from the bitter disillusionment which comes to too many when
they emerge from school, a disillusionment like that described by Silone
in the following passage: "Don Paolo went back to his room to reflect
on the peasants and their lives. .... The idea occurred to him of using
his remaining time at Pietrasecca to finish his essay on the agrarian
question. He took his notebook from his bag and started reading the
notes he had started. .. .He read them through, and was astonished
and dismayed at their abstract character. All these quotations from
masters and disciples on the agrarian question, all those plans and
schemes, were the paper scenery in which he had hitherto lived. The
country which was the subject of those notes of his was a paper country,
with paper mountains, paper hills, fields, gardens, and meadows. The
great events recorded in them were mostly paper events, paper battles,
and paper victories. The peasants were paper peasants." 101
LEGAL MAGIC
The reluctance of most law teachers to look squarely at real lawyers
and at court-house realities recalls a letter Galileo wrote Kepler several
hundred years since. "Here at Padua," he said, "is the principal pro-
fessor of philosophy, whom I have repeatedly and urgently requested to
look at the moon and planets through my glass, which he pertinaciously
refuses to do. Why are you not here? What shouts of laughter we
should have at this glorious folly! And to hear the professor of philos-
ophy at Pisa laboring before the Grand Duke with logical arguments,
100. Morgan, Book Review, 49 HA v. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1935).
101. S.oN-, BREAD AND WMn 131 (1937).
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as if with magical incantations to charm the . . . planets out of the
sky."1
I have a real hope that the law schools will soon stop trying to use
logical arguments as magical incantations to prevent law students from
observing what goes on in the legal cosmos. 10"1 With the cessation of
that legal magic, 03 we shall have true lawyer-schools. 104
102. A law professor who heard this talk remarked critically that looking at planets
differs from Jooking at human beings (including judges'and juries and witnesses) be-
cause humans talk but planets do not. That comment is grist for my mill. It confirms
my thesis that legal study is far more difficult than study of astronomy or physics, that
observation of courts in action will show law students that the quantum of prediction
open to lawyers is bound to be far less than in the physical sciences, that we should
shun the words "legal science" and "social sciences."
The following comments by Johnson on Jefferson's predictions are illuminating:
"Taking the facts, and nothing but the facts; taking the rate of change as it had pro-
ceeded between 1607 and the Revolution and assumlng-as he had every right to assume
-that it would continue at something in the order of the same rate; he worked out a
prophecy of the development of the country that events fulfilled with remarkable pre-
cision for more than a generation. He realized that the trend toward centralization was
bound to be opposed by the development of particularist interests, and his calculations
convinced him that if both trends continued unchecked, stresses would develop that
would rend the country. All this was logical and accurate. The trends did continue,
the stresses did develop, and the country was rent. Nevertheless, Jefferson, although
an admirable logician, was a false prophet, for the country survives. Yet the error was
not in his logic. The error was in that inescapable, irremovable factor that every lo-
gician faces when he assumes to deal with huntan beings. He inay predict the tnove-
ments of a planet or of an electron for a thousand years with alnost absolute accuracy.
He imay predict the development of fruit-flies, or of guinea-pigs through inany genera-
tions with a factor of error of negligible proportions. But the moment hunanity cuters the
equation, mathematical calculation loses its authority; in the presence of this incalculable
element, thd realistic approach may be anything but real." JoiNsoN, AmERICAN r HEoEs
AND HERO WORsHIP 64-5 (1943). (Emphasis added). See also Cox, Business Forecasting
in 6 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 348 (1931).
103. As to the persistence in much modern legal thinking and legal education of mag-
ical notions not unrelated to those which gave rise to the ordeals, see FRANIC, IF MEN
WERE ANGELs 114-8 (1942). This thesis is developed in my course-book on FAcr-FIND-
ING which I use in teaching at Yale Law School.
104. Only after this article had gone to press did I read BRADWAY, CLINICAL 'PREPARA-
TION FOR LAW PRACTICE (1946). Inexcusably, I had previously been unaware of the clini-
cal teaching methods, there described, which apparently he has used for some years at
Duke University Law School. In large part, those methods upply what I consider wanting
in most university law schools. I say "in large part," because it seems that (1) the clinical
work at Duke comes late in the student's law-school career, (2) is not closely integrated
with "social studies," psychology and philosophy, and (3) does not stress the importance
of policy-making in general and of reform of trial-court fact-finding in particular. Never-
theless, I recommend that everyone interested in legal education read Bradway's book,
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